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Abstract
Background: Data protection is important for all information systems that deal with human-
subjects data. Grid-based systems – such as the cancer Biomedical Informatics Grid (caBIG) – seek
to develop new mechanisms to facilitate real-time federation of cancer-relevant data sources,
including sources protected under a variety of regulatory laws, such as HIPAA and 21CFR11. These
systems embody new models for data sharing, and hence pose new challenges to the regulatory
community, and to those who would develop or adopt them. These challenges must be understood
by both systems developers and system adopters. In this paper, we describe our work collecting
policy statements, expectations, and requirements from regulatory decision makers at academic
cancer centers in the United States. We use these statements to examine fundamental assumptions
regarding data sharing using data federations and grid computing.
Methods: An interview-based study of key stakeholders from a sample of US cancer centers.
Interviews were structured, and used an instrument that was developed for the purpose of this
study. The instrument included a set of problem scenarios – difficult policy situations that were
derived during a full-day discussion of potentially problematic issues by a set of project participants
with diverse expertise. Each problem scenario included a set of open-ended questions that were
designed to elucidate stakeholder opinions and concerns. Interviews were transcribed verbatim
and used for both qualitative and quantitative analysis. For quantitative analysis, data was aggregated
at the individual or institutional unit of analysis, depending on the specific interview question.
Results: Thirty-one (31) individuals at six cancer centers were contacted to participate. Twenty-
four out of thirty-one (24/31) individuals responded to our request- yielding a total response rate
of 77%. Respondents included IRB directors and policy-makers, privacy and security officers,
directors of offices of research, information security officers and university legal counsel. Nineteen
total interviews were conducted over a period of 16 weeks. Respondents provided answers for all
four scenarios (a total of 87 questions). Results were grouped by broad themes, including among
others: governance, legal and financial issues, partnership agreements, de-identification, institutional
technical infrastructure for security and privacy protection, training, risk management, auditing, IRB
issues, and patient/subject consent.
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Conclusion: The findings suggest that with additional work, large scale federated sharing of data
within a regulated environment is possible. A key challenge is developing suitable models for
authentication and authorization practices within a federated environment. Authentication – the
recognition and validation of a person's identity – is in fact a global property of such systems, while
authorization – the permission to access data or resources – mimics data sharing agreements in
being best served at a local level. Nine specific recommendations result from the work and are
discussed in detail. These include: (1) the necessity to construct separate legal or corporate entities
for governance of federated sharing initiatives on this scale; (2) consensus on the treatment of
foreign and commercial partnerships; (3) the development of risk models and risk management
processes; (4) development of technical infrastructure to support the credentialing process
associated with research including human subjects; (5) exploring the feasibility of developing large-
scale, federated honest broker approaches; (6) the development of suitable, federated identity
provisioning processes to support federated authentication and authorization; (7) community
development of requisite HIPAA and research ethics training modules by federation members; (8)
the recognition of the need for central auditing requirements and authority, and; (9) use of two-
protocol data exchange models where possible in the federation.
Background
caBIG and Grid Computing
An important emerging computing paradigm for life sci-
ence research – grid based computing [1] – promotes
large-scale sharing of data and computing resources. Grids
can be classified broadly as computational grids, whose
primary function is to provide large scale distributed com-
puting capability, or data grids whose principle function
is to provide the ability to query and aggregate data from
multiple, independent data sources. Successful grids in
both areas already exist. BIRN [2] and the @neurIST
project[3] are examples of data-centric grids, while the
Open Science Grid[4], and TeraGrid [5] are computation-
ally focused grids. Launched in February 2004, the cancer
Biomedical Informatics Grid [6](caBIG)  is a data grid
under development by the National Cancer Institute
(NCI) Center for Bioinformatics. As of 2007, the caBIG
project included more than 1,000 individuals at over 80
institutions, including NCI-designated cancer centers,
NCI community cancer centers, Clinical Trials Coopera-
tive Groups, NCI Specialized Programs of Research Excel-
lence, and a variety of other participants from academia
and industry [7]. The goal of this effort is to provide dis-
tributed computerized systems that can speed research
discoveries and improve patient outcomes by linking
researchers, physicians, and patients throughout the can-
cer community. Federation is accomplished using
advanced grid computing "middleware" based on the
Globus toolkit [8] termed "caGrid" [9]. In addition to
basic capabilities, such as automatic discovery of remote
data services and distributed queries, caBIG seeks to pro-
vide a level of semantic inference and semantic interoper-
ability of systems by supporting strong data typing, by
providing registered models for data and metadata associ-
ated with an application, by binding data models to an
underlying description-logic ontology, and through rigor-
ous peer review during software development. A full
description of the caBIG project is beyond the scope of
this paper. Details may be found online [10].
Purpose and scope of study
The purpose of this study was to develop a preliminary set
of security policies and procedures applicable to institu-
tions that participate in caBIG. To do this, the investiga-
tors used team-based methods to develop structured
interview instruments and then used these instruments to
systematically collect policy statements by decision mak-
ers involved in regulatory practices at six United States
cancer centers. Four of the six institutions were chosen
because they were in the process of adopting and deploy-
ing caTIES – a caBIG application developed by one of the
authors (RC). caTIES provides a repository for deidenti-
fied data containing discrete data elements abstracted
from free-text anatomic pathology reports. The caTIES
application was one of the earliest grid enabled caBIG sys-
tems with the potential to share human-derived data, and
thus provided a useful test-bed for discussions with stake-
holders.
Although neither comprehensive nor exhaustive, this
study developed valuable primary data on the attitudes of
those involved in regulatory decision-making relevant to
the development and functioning of a large-scale and fed-
erated, biomedical data grid. This data was ultimately
used to inform development of a series of white papers
[11-18] summarizing various aspects of security policy
and procedural recommendations to the caBIG program
office.
Special problems posed by multi-site federations
Large-scale data sharing initiatives will be effective only if
they are widely adopted. If adoption requires negotiation
of specific, binding pair-wise agreements, legal or regula-
tory in nature, the burden of creating and managing theseBMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2009, 9:31 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/9/31
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agreements for thousands of participants across hundreds
of organizations will be the square of the number of par-
ticipants, which will be prohibitive in scope and scale.
Consequently, adoption models must allow regulatory
needs to be met, while supporting flexibility and growth
of the underlying organization. Many existing organiza-
tions have evolved in part to address this scaling issue. The
cancer Cooperative Groups, BIRN and many other groups
have developed reciprocal business agreements that ena-
ble linear scaling of agreements, although for clinical
datasets there are typically additional agreements that are
put in place that are in fact facilitated by the umbrella
business agreement.
Adoption also requires trust between data providers and
consumers who use the infrastructure and regulators who
oversee the process. Trust relies on an understanding of
the needs all stakeholder groups, and the development of
suitable technology to meet these needs. As used in a tech-
nical context, the term "trust" describes the degree of
assurance a relying party may place in a digital assertion
(usually termed a "certificate") given by some entity (usu-
ally termed a Certifying Authority). These assertions may
be concerned with either Authentication, i.e., who or what
a given entity is, or Authorization, which deals with the
rights or privileges an entity may possess. A full descrip-
tion of the formal concepts and foundations of trust is
beyond the scope of this paper; however the interested
reader is referred to the paper by Chapin [19]. An effective
security system in a federated environment is well served
by having a mechanism for expressing and maintaining
differing degrees of this digital "trustworthiness" between
multiple parties. For a description of the novel technical
mechanisms developed for caBIG see the description of
the GAARDS security system in Oster [9]. From a legal or
governance perspective, existing federations often employ
"trust agreements" of some degree to reify expectations
between parties. An example of such an agreement may be
seen in the InCommon Participation Agreement [20].
Regulatory personnel require that data sharing agree-
ments and technical mechanisms used between investiga-
tors adhere to HIPAA [21], the Common Rule [22],
21CFR11 [23], and other regulations. Investigators
require that the systems protect their intellectual capital.
Tech-transfer officers want the system to protect intellec-
tual property. These requirements lead to technical impli-
cations for the design, implementation, and operation of
caBIG systems including how potential users at multiple
sites are identified, made known to, and ultimately
authorized to access those systems.
From its inception, the caBIG project has been committed
to a federated, as opposed to a centralized model. In this
federated model, data are stored and managed locally in
systems that can communicate with other geographically
distributed systems using the capabilities of the caGrid
middleware. In principle, each individual research group
or institution can retain ultimate control over who has
access to its data at all times. However, accurate access-
control (i.e. authorization) decisions cannot occur with-
out knowledge of who is requesting access, for what pur-
pose, and with what authority. Consequently, caBIG
includes identity management processes in its federation
model to provide the needed authentication on which
authorization decisions ultimately rely.
If caBIG or any federated biomedical data grid is to meet
the needs of all relevant parties, those needs must be
known – especially those of the often non-technical staff
charged with overseeing data integrity and privacy.
Existing Regulatory Constraints
There are several regulations that must be recognized and
addressed for federated biomedical grids such as caBIG to
function effectively. The following regulations are not
intended to constitute an exclusive list of all potential reg-
ulations affecting biomedical grids, as there are numerous
federal and state regulations that will affect operations.
Below, we list and briefly introduce the key regulations
governing federated biomedical data sharing consortia.
HIPAA
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act[21] Privacy Rule found in 45 CFR 164, regulates the
use and disclosure of Protected Health Information (PHI),
including PHI's electronic transmission. HIPAA imposes
important requirements for research performed using
caGrid, including strict requirements for informed con-
sent and data de-identification.
Institutional Review Boards
Institutional Review Boards (IRB) have the authority to
approve, require modifications, or disapprove and disal-
low research on human subjects under Food and Drug
(FDA) and Health and Human Services (HHS) regula-
tions[15]. IRBs may require institutions to implement
specific IRB and HIPAA training programs and other pol-
icies and procedures for institutions and researchers to
perform human subjects' research. For institutions to
obtain IRB approval to participate in caGrid, it appears
IRBs may seek reassurance of the ability of caBIG to ensure
safe practices for human subject research by all caGrid par-
ticipants, including compliance with honest broker and
informed consent requirements.
IACUC
The Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees pro-
vide regulatory oversight of research involving laboratory
animals. Every institution that uses animals for federallyBMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2009, 9:31 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/9/31
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funded laboratory research must have an IACUC, which
reviews research protocols and evaluates an institution's
animal care and use.
21 CFR Part 11: Electronic Records and Signatures
21 CFR 11 consists of FDA regulations for electronic
records and electronic signatures to be considered trust-
worthy and equivalent to paper records and handwritten
signatures. Part 11 requires various controls, including
audits and validation systems, to be implemented as part
of a regulated entity's operations.
Federal Employee Regulations and Standards
There are various federal regulations and standards gov-
erning federal employees' and contractors' use of elec-
tronic equipment, such as the Federal Information
Processing Standards 201–1 (Personal Identity Verifica-
tion requirements), that will have some impact on caBIG.
State Privacy Laws
Each state may establish its own privacy laws, governing
the use and disclosure of personal information. These
laws vary by state, and may be more stringent than federal
laws, such as HIPAA, requiring additional regulatory com-
pliance by institutions in those states.
The Structural Basis of Federations
Federations by definition consist of multiple entities
which must be bound together by a shared framework of
governance. The Liberty Alliance [24], a consortium work-
ing to define interoperable federated computing environ-
ments, defines three major governance models for
federations [25]. Each model has specific strengths and
weaknesses. These constraints must be understood in
selecting a governance model and developing policy. To
operate, federations typically must have agreements in
place to describe the structure of the federation, how it
will be governed, the requirements and rules expected
between the various parties. Consequently, establishing a
federation requires higher level governing structures,
guidelines, and policies. These are in addition to the secu-
rity, privacy, and data sharing policies of the individual
organizations. Since trust relies on the adherence to
agreed upon policies in these areas by all participants,
some degree of policy reconciliation between the mem-
bers of the federation is usually necessary. Three pertinent
examples of moderately mature federated environments
are presented below.
Liberty Alliance
The Liberty Alliance [24] is a group of over 30 commercial
and other organizations formed to establish open stand-
ards, guidelines, and best practices for federated identity
management. The group has been a leader in the specifi-
cation, certification, and development of various proto-
cols, guideline documents, and policies related to
developing successful wide-scale identity federations.
Safe-BioPharma Association
The Safe-BioPharma Association [26] is a group that has
developed and promoted specific digital identity and dig-
ital signature standards to promote interoperability of sys-
tems across corporate boundaries. As such, they function
as a federation. The federation focuses on the specific
business requirements and interchange of information
between the BioPharma industry, various regulatory bod-
ies, such as the FDA, and the healthcare industry.
InCommon
InCommon [27] is an identity federation run by a large
consortium of institutions of higher education in the
United States. The goal of the federation is to promote
interoperability of systems across institutional boundaries
for faculty, researchers, staff, and students in the US
research and education sphere. As of October 2008 the
consortium lists over 2.2 million users in over 108 aca-
demic and research organizations, and it includes major
academic publishers, libraries, 72 higher education partic-
ipants, including a number of large state university sys-
tems, and several major government and government-
sponsored programs. Of particular relevance for this
paper are the NIH and TeraGrid.
Methods
Our approach was to develop structured elicitation inter-
views of key regulatory personnel at a subset of cancer
centers involved in exchange of data using the caBIG sys-
tem. Interview instruments were developed using a team-
based approach. Regulatory participants were recruited,
and telephone or in-person interviews were conducted.
Results were tabulated according to job description, type
of institution, and other relevant classifications. These
were used by the investigators to determine the stated fun-
damental security and privacy drivers involved in a multi-
center use of the grid for de-identified data exchange.
Development of the interview instrument
The interviews utilized problem scenarios developed col-
laboratively during a one-and-a-half day intensive face-to-
face meeting that occurred in Pittsburgh, June 12–13,
2006. Thirty-eight individuals representing a wide spec-
trum of experts and stakeholders from US Cancer Centers
and the NIH spent approximately four hours discussing
and brainstorming about potential barriers to the multi-
institutional sharing of data, through caBIG. Individuals
who participated in the development of the instruments
included representatives of the security project (7), mem-
bers of the Data Sharing and Intellectual Capital Working
Group (3) and Architecture Working Group (1), Institu-
tional Review Board directors (3), external advisors (3),BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2009, 9:31 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/9/31
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grid technologists (3), NCICB representatives (5), patient
advocates (3), caTIES adopters (4), caTIES development
team (2), and other stakeholders (4).
Meeting participants were asked to think broadly about
issues that might pose problems, particularly those where
we expected significant variation among cancer centers.
Issues were collected into a master list and sorted into four
general categories. The categories which emerged from
this process were: (1) Locus of control/decision making,
(2) De-identification and IRB Policy, (3) Authentication
and Authorization, and (4) Consenting.
Participants then divided into four breakout groups, one
for each of these major themes, and constructed scenarios
and draft interview questions designed to elicit informa-
tion during the interviews. All scenarios used caTIES as the
example system. Participants met at the end of the day to
critique the resulting scenarios.
Following the face-to-face meeting, the authors edited the
interview scenarios to ensure adequate coverage of the
issues, improve the understandability and simplicity of
the interview questions, and match interview questions to
organizational roles of interviewees. The resulting draft
instruments (see additional file 1) were reviewed by all
meeting participants, and modified in three subsequent
rounds of editing and draft revisions. Together, the four
interview instruments contained a total of 87 questions.
The topic of each scenario along with the organizational
roles of intended respondents and the number of ques-
tions are shown in Table 1.
Participants
We contacted individuals across six United States (US)
cancer centers involved in the caBIG project. Participating
cancer centers included all four current adopters of the
caTIES System, the test-bed system described in the Inter-
view Instrument. All four are university-affiliated. Two
other institutions represented stand-alone cancer centers
involved in the caBIG project, and were included to
broaden the sample, because of a concern that data
obtained from the four university-affiliated cancer centers
might not generalize to stand-alone cancer centers. These
two centers represented a convenience sample of centers
affiliated with the authors. The total percentage of stan-
dalone centers in this sample (2/6) is similar to the per-
centage of stand-alone cancer centers across the nation
(13/63).
For each institution, we asked a collaborator at that insti-
tution to identify key individuals with decision-making
authority who, we anticipated, would need to be involved
in the development of a federated grid for data sharing
across institutions. The roles of these individuals thus var-
ied somewhat based on the organizational structure and
culture of the participating institution.
Data Collection
Interviews were conducted either on-site (N = 5) or by tel-
ephone (N = 14), based upon conditions of approval of
the participating institution. For all interviews, we pro-
vided participants with the interview scenarios in
advance. Interviews were recorded as digital files, and
transcribed verbatim. The interviewer maintained a key
indicating the organization and role of the participant.
Identifying information regarding participant and institu-
tion was scrubbed from the resulting documents to gener-
ate the final de-identified transcripts.
Data Analysis
The interviewer manually coded the interviews, using
principles of both quantitative and qualitative data analy-
sis.
Quantitative Analysis
The interview scenarios were structured such that individ-
ual participants were asked a subset of the 87 questions
across four scenarios, based on organizational role and
expertise. Responses to the 87 interview questions were
aggregated in Excel. For some objective questions regard-
ing organizational policy or processes, only a single
answer was sought from an individual with sufficient
authority to respond. Consequently, during the analysis
Table 1: Questions intended for each type interviewee.
Scenario Topic Target respondents Questions
1 Identification of local, organizational environment, 
stakeholders and decision-making processes
IRB members, security officers, HIPAA compliance 
officers, Office of Research administrators
1.1 – 1.19
2 De-identification IRB members 2.1 – 2.22
3 Auditing Security officers, HIPAA compliance officers, Office of 
Research administrators
3.1 – 3.20
4 Prospective Research Consenting IRB members, Office of Research administrators 4.1 – 4.9BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2009, 9:31 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/9/31
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phase, we chose to alternate the unit of analysis depend-
ing on the interview question.
For questions related primarily to the institution, we
aggregate all information from multiple individuals
across a single institution and present statistics with insti-
tution as the unit of analysis. For questions where each
participant provided a single response, we show counts
with interview as the unit of analysis. When two individu-
als were interviewed together, and we found no instances
of disagreements, we recorded only one response per
interview. For questions where participants enumerated
multiple items in response to a question, we use interview
statements as the unit of analysis.
Qualitative Analysis
Many issues were discussed during these semi-structured
interviews that provide guidance for developing security
processes and policies. Key issues and opinions from all
interviews were highlighted in the files, and used to distill
a set of themes and issues for qualitative data analysis.
Areas where there appears to be consensus and areas that
show strongly divergent views are discussed using quota-
tions from the primary data. Commonly accepted editing
and proofing standards were used to clarify quotes when
necessary without changing the contextual meaning. For
example, any added words or phrases appear in block
parenthesis []. Every precaution was taken to maintain the
integrity of the original quotes. In order to assure that
quotations were representative of the entire sample and
not a small set of participants, we examined the distribu-
tion of quotations after the manuscript was completed.
Results
Characteristics of the Interview Participant Sample
We contacted thirty-one (31) individuals at six cancer
centers with requests to participate. Twenty-four out of
thirty-one (24/31) individuals responded to our request-
yielding a total response rate of 77%. The distribution of
organizational affiliation of participants is shown in Table
2. Nineteen total interviews were conducted over a period
of 16 weeks.
At one institution (Institution D), we were only able to
recruit a single participant. Therefore, for questions in
which the unit of analysis is the institution, we include
only five of the six institutions. Data obtained from the
single individual from cancer center D is included only in
quantitative analyses where the unit of analysis is the indi-
vidual and in qualitative analyses.
Fourteen interviews were conducted with one participant
only and five interviews were conducted with two partici-
pants together. In all interviews where two participants
were interviewed together, the pairs consisted of supervi-
sor-supervisee dyads that worked at the same institution.
In all cases, one of the two individuals originally con-
tacted specifically requested that their supervisor or super-
visee participate jointly in the interview.
The roles of participants within their organizations are
shown in Table 3. In some cases, individuals served in
multiple capacities within their organizations (for exam-
ple information security officer and privacy officer); there-
fore, the total number of roles recorded in Table 3 exceeds
the number of respondents.
Analysis of interview responses grouped by theme
The following sections contain responses to the interview
questions grouped by theme, and include both quantita-
tive and qualitative analyses of the pattern of responses.
Tables indicating quantitative results include captions
which describe the total number of respondents and their
organizational roles. Questions posed in each interview
were specific to organizational role, and hence the
denominator varies with each question. In addition to
Table 2: Institutional Affiliations of Interview Participants.
Institution Cancer Center Organizational Structure caTIES Adopter Number of Participants
A University Affiliated Yes 4
B University Affiliated Yes 7
C University Affiliated Yes 3
D University Affiliated Yes 1
E Stand-Alone No 4
F Stand-Alone No 5
Total 24BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2009, 9:31 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/9/31
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aggregating and quantifying the responses, we also looked
for issues or requirements that could have technical, as
well as policy or procedural, implications for the opera-
tion of caGrid. Figure 1 depicts the distribution of quota-
tions across interviews, and shows that all participants are
represented in the analysis.
Project structure and governance
Necessity of a governance structure
Over 85% of individuals expressed the opinion that
multi-institutional data sharing through the caGrid
requires a governing body (Table 4).
The need for a governing body was expressed across the
entire spectrum of organizational roles, from IRB directors
to information technology (IT) security managers to pri-
vacy officers and Office of Research representatives:
"I do think that from an institutional level there should be
a governing body to provide guidance and to enforce policy,
and to make policy for all the systems that will interact and
handle activity with other institutions. As far as what func-
tions they would dictate, [they] would be all around the
authorization, authentication, and accounting of access to
that data."
- IT Security Manager
I personally think there needs to be a governing body. I
know there is a great desire not to have any type of central-
ized functions ...but I think there needs to be [to] provide
an audit and oversight function capability. It also has to
provide the process by which people become certified to
receive data, and I think also it needs to make decisions
when somebody is no longer entitled to receive data,
whether that be because they are no longer part of the
project or that . . or in some way jeopardized their standing
due to having done the wrong thing with the data, but I
think there needs to be that level of oversight.
- Privacy Officer
Others felt that a governing body would be useful but that
it was critical to achieve the right balance between guid-
ance and standards at the multi-institutional level, and
the flexibility to interpret and adapt them at the local
level:
"I think operations are to be [at] the local level and stand-
ards at the network level, if you will, so similar to IRB
standards or rules, those are set at a federal level but
administered locally. And, there is a process for auditing as
to whether or not the standards are met, and I think that
builds in the most consistency at the one level, because you
do not want people engaging in different practices, and the
most flexibility at the local level... I think the major point of
making good general rules, good general standards, using
standards that are already out there, and then letting insti-
tutions administer them locally is the best... I used to be VP
for Regulatory Affairs, and I cannot think of a regulation
Table 3: Organizational Roles of Participants Interviewed.
Organizational Role Count
University and IRB legal counsel 3
IRB Director or Chair, or Director of Human Subjects Protection 5
IRB Regulatory Affairs Officer 1
Information Security Officer 3
Hospital Privacy Officer 3
Hospital Compliance Officer 1
University or Research Institution Privacy Officer (supervising Hospital Privacy Officer) 4
University or Research Institution Compliance Officer 3
Institutional Strategic Planning Executive 2
Director of Office of Research, or Vice President for Research 3
Hospital Department Director of Information Services 1BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2009, 9:31 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/9/31
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that I would like to have administered from on high,
because you just cannot know the local circumstances."
- Vice President for Planning and Business Admin-
istration
Potential functions of a governing body
Participants suggested a large number of potential func-
tions for the governing body in overseeing the sharing of
data. All responses collected are enumerated in Table 5.
The resulting functions cover a broad range of categories
including common guidelines for data use, community-
wide IRB functions, risk assessment, general security poli-
cies and procedures, audit and oversight, reporting and
enforcement, and selection of external standards for oper-
ation. In addition to the operational functions, partici-
pants also suggested several more abstract responsibilities.
Some participants indicated that the governing body was
necessary in order to build trust among the participant
organizations. Participants also suggested that the govern-
ing body must provide a strategic role, for example by
monitoring the Office of Human Research Protections
(OHRP) regulations or new laws that might affect the use
of the federated grid.
Requirement that the collaboration be a legal entity
One university legal counsel articulated the need for the
collaboration to be a legal entity. The benefit of a legal
entity is that the entity carries insurance and provides a
single point of authority for enforcement should the
terms of the contract be breached. The legal entity reduces
risk to individual participating organizations.
"Is this going to be an incorporated entity? Because that is
going to be big, because when you talk...to lawyers about
this, if there were for example, an institution [that] said
that we are going to be the people who are responsible for
administering all of this and signing the contract. I can sign
an agreement with them in which they agree to handle my
data a certain way, and I agree to make the data available
to them for approved users. I know them. They have insur-
ance. They have lawyers who make sure that...they will go
after people if something is violated ... I can go to them and
say you've breached your agreement because this person has
done this and they will go after them. If you are talking
about it being open, a consortium of entities with just an
MOU (Memorandum of Understanding) or something in
place that's not going to work"
Distribution of quotes across the participants Figure 1
Distribution of quotes across the participants.
Table 4: Does the caBIG project require a governing body for 
data sharing?
Response Count Percentage
Yes 14 87.5
No 1 6.3
Unsure 1 6.3
Scenario 1 – Question 3. A total of 16 interviews provided responses. 
Respondents included individuals from all organizational roles. Data 
was aggregated with interview as the unit of analysis.BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2009, 9:31 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/9/31
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Table 5: Potential functions of the governing body suggested by participants.
Functions of a Governing Body Suggested by Interview Participants Count
Data Use
Establish principles of operation of the community 3
Make project-wide decisions regarding appropriate use of data and tissue (rules of engagement) 5
Establish uniform position on data ownership and intellectual property 1
Set standards for assuring data integrity 1
Establish common guidelines on professional credentials needed to access specific types of data 2
Oversee the "joining" of organizations 4
Review privacy laws and research ethics guidelines for potential foreign partners before entry 2
Community-Wide IRB Functions
Provide community-wide assurance that all repositories have appropriate IRB review 1
Establish common Data Safety Monitoring Plans agreeable to constituent IRBs 1
Act as a community-wide Data Safety Monitoring Board 1
Establish standards for Human Subjects Research (HSR) and HIPAA training; require institutions to assess own training modules; 
publish results to community
1
Provide guidance on common consent form language across caBIG 2
Random checks of user publications to determine whether data use appropriate to protocol 1
Risk Assessment
Establish common levels of data risk and identify security mechanisms appropriate for risk level 1
Provide centralized statistical assurance of minimal risk of re-identification for systems 2
Establish Security Policies and Processes
Prevent and police abuse 4
Establish common guidelines for provisioning and de-provisioning users 2
Establish requirements for monitoring credentialing process and assess incoming progress reports 2
Establish standards for authorization 2
Set minimum standards for physical security 2
Set standards for what users will have to agree to do and not do 1
Audit and Oversight
Aggregate audit information and provide reports back to member institutions 2BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2009, 9:31 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/9/31
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- University and IRB Legal Counsel
The need for a legal entity was posited regardless of
whether data was identified or de-identified. This partici-
pant suggested that caBIG consider forming its own non-
profit incorporated entity. The formation of such an entity
would greatly simplify the legal requirements for joining
caBIG for this institution. In fact, the institution has pre-
vious experience with data sharing under these condi-
tions:
"I actually just had one the other day where the entity that
is incorporated . . .where you can see this sometimes is...the
incorporated non-profit [consists of] institutions that want
to share resources or want to come together to facilitate
research on a specific disease... often a kind of a rare organ
disease. So I just got something from another institution
where there is this network of doctors who are all interested
in research on this rare disease, and in that case, they actu-
ally formed a separate non-profit that is functioning like a
contract research organization for that disease"
Monitor compliance with established and agreed upon processes 2
Periodic checks of whether the data which is supposed to be de-identified is REALLY de-identified 1
Investigation of security incidents 1
Reporting and Enforcement
Establish enforcement policy for sanctioning of organizations or individuals who misuse resource 1
Report misuse to OHRP, ORI and funding agency when necessary 1
Issue federation-wide reports of security incidents 1
Maintain federation "No Fly" list of researchers not permitted access anymore from any institution 2
Mediation
Mediate disputes between organizations 2
Accept requests to appeal decisions at local institutions (for example termination of access) 1
Build Trust within the Community
Build trust among institutions that data will be used appropriately 3
Build trust in veracity of user identities 1
External Standards and Best Practices
Set external standards participating institutions must meet (e.g. CLIA approval of tissue-banks) 1
Seek out and publicize community-wide best practices 1
Strategic Role
Establish goals for the entire project and ensure that operation is in keeping with those goals 1
Monitor new regulations coming from the federal government and address relevance to sites 1
Assess and address weaknesses of the collaborative research environment 1
Address novel problems 1
Scenario 1 – Question 3. A total of 17 interviews provided responses. Respondents included individuals from all organizational roles. Data was 
aggregated with interview statement as the unit of analysis
Table 5: Potential functions of the governing body suggested by participants. (Continued)BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2009, 9:31 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/9/31
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- University and IRB Legal Counsel
In the absence of an incorporated entity, this participant
suggested that it would be necessary for the institution to
sign separate Data Use and Confidentiality Agreements
with each participating organization. To streamline the
process, the participant suggested using common forms
for Data Use and Confidentiality Agreements between
institutions and Authorized User Agreements among
users. The Data Use agreement may need to specify that
the receiving organization is responsible for policing com-
pliance. Institutions may need to understand exactly what
resources are necessary for meeting these compliance
requirements.
Trust agreements
Participants recognized the importance of agreements
between institutions and were largely in agreement with
what such documents should contain.
Important areas to be covered under trust agreements
The majority of participants agreed that documents
should contain language related to all of the elements
described in Table 6.
We also asked participants to suggest other potential areas
that should be covered in the trust agreements. Areas sug-
gested included language on intellectual property, agree-
ments to participate in a compliance program including
audits, agreements to be bound by the local IRB, and
statements that data is not provided with a warranty of
compliance (Table 7).
Indemnification and liability allocation
One participant indicated that their institution typically
included a statement that the institution providing data
made no warranty of its compliance. This requirement
that institutions be able to submit data with no warranty
as to their compliance status is completely contradictory
to another requirement that "local caBIG repository own-
ers and stewards need to be able to define and attest to the
risk level specific to their context and state law. Sharing of
data must operate under these constraints." Additional
work is needed to determine how best to reconcile these
opposing positions.
Assuming for the moment, that caBIG does try to support
warranty-free data sharing, it may be difficult to get all
institutions to agree to a blanket, use-at-your-own-risk
policy. However, one interviewee noted that a more gen-
eral statement about responsibility for acts of negligence
might meet with less resistance:
"Typically what we would do is we would state that the data
is not provided with any warranty with respect to its suita-
bility or with respect to its compliance. The receiving entity
is going to want to take responsibility if there was a mistake
in the de-identification process, and data gets out. We are
going to want them to assume liability for anything that
happens to the data once they get it. You're right. State
institutions will not agree to this indemnity provision. I
Table 6: Which elements should be included in the trust agreements?
Element of Trust Agreement Yes No Unsure
Count % Count % Count %
Integrity Protections 7 87.5 0 0 1 12.5
Assurance that staff will receive training including on privacy and security 8 88.9 1 11.1 0 0.0
Agreement to participate in defined security incident response policies 9 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Statements that users will not re-identify 10 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Statements that users will not use data for any other purpose 10 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Liability Allocation 8 80.0 1 10.0 1 10.0
Indemnification 5 71.4 1 14.3 1 14.3
Penalties for breaching terms of agreement 8 88.9 1 11.1 0 0.0
Scenario 2 – Question 16. A total of 10 interviews provided responses. However not all respondents considered themselves sufficiently expert to 
determine the importance of inclusion of specific items, hence the denominator of the table varies by item between 7 and 10. Respondents included 
university and IRB legal counsels, IRB directors, Office of Research representatives, and Privacy and Compliance officers. Data was aggregated with 
interview statement as the unit of analysis.BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2009, 9:31 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/9/31
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think we might be able to come up with a statement that is
very benign that says that each party is responsible for acts
arising from their own negligence...Universities collaborate
with each other all the time. We call them subcontracts on
federal grants, and then we both fight over indemnification
because the federal demonstration project, which was a
project to try to come up with a common form for subbing
federal grants, takes the approach that sort of we all say
'Everybody – you are responsible for what you do, I am
responsible for what I do.' End of story. And I would suggest
that you take a similar approach in this kind of agreement."
- University and IRB Legal Counsel
Another participant noted that although liability and
indemnification were useful legal tools, they did not
address all kinds of risk:
"From a risk perspective, there are different kinds of risks...
financial risk, operational risk, reputation risk, compliance
risk... the liability and indemnification... minimize finan-
cial risk and maybe operation... but they do not eliminate
reputation risks, and that could be the biggest risk, espe-
cially in research where people may shut down your
project."
- University Privacy Officer
From this participant's perspective, agreements could only
go so far. Other protections, such as auditing and compli-
ance checking, may well be necessary to minimize more
substantial risks such as those to reputation.
Intellectual property
Participants differed markedly as to whether language
regarding Intellectual Property (IP) should be included in
the agreements. Many participants felt that the IP
belonged solely to the individual making the discovery,
and that each organization had an equal opportunity to
gain from the aggregated data, leaving it to them to exploit
this advantage:
"Because the data would remain the property of the provid-
ing party, and so [in] the agreement you would really have
to specify that the data remains the property of the provid-
ing party – they are only getting the right to use it. Once
somebody does use the data, in my opinion, the intellectual
property would be owned by the person who made the
breakthrough."
- University and IRB Legal Counsel
"But I don't see this stuff as anything but raw material. The
inventor's act takes at (sic) place at the receiving institu-
tion, and if that's the case, the providing institution has no
role in the invention whatsoever. It's a raw material... It's
the hammer and nails. You make a house of it, it's yours...
If you really know you have the most precious nail there is,
then you have a couple of choices. One is do not put [it] in
the repository in the first place. Number two is make it
available with some level of restrictions, through an NDA,
like for research purposes only. And number three, is give it
away freely. Those are your only choices. And none of those
require a complicated legal agreement."
- Vice President for Planning and Business Devel-
opment
Other participants were not as willing to make such a clear
distinction between the inventor and the provider of the
information, or materials used in the invention, especially
if they retained ownership of data throughout its use:
"I would think that the only thing you could really stipulate
by contract up front would be that there...in the event of a
discovery, all of the parties need to be informed, and they
would cooperate in coming up with some allocations.
Another way to think about it is what's happening with the
data ownership? If we are going to say – great we are par-
ticipating, and the moment it becomes de-identified, it is no
longer our data, but part of the collective data, and then the
invention, any intellectual property rather that is a result of
any use of that data will reside where the person is
Table 7: Other elements that should be included in trust agreements.
Additional Suggested Elements of Trust Agreements Count
Agreement to participate in compliance program including audits 4
Intellectual Property 2
Statement that repositories will be IRB approved, and that users will abide by IRB practices 2
Statement that data is not provided with warranty of compliance 1
Scenario 2 – Question 17. Data was aggregated with interview statement as the unit of analysis.BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2009, 9:31 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/9/31
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employed. If, however, the ownership is not sort of given up
into this collection, that's going to be much more problem-
atic."
- Director, Officer of Research Administration
Another concern raised about intellectual property was
the potential for data to become available through the
grid inadvertently that is owned by some third party,
potentially a for-profit entity:
"I'll tell you the thing that worries me more than that is val-
uable information or samples that have been obtained from
commercial parties under NDAs put into the tissue reposi-
tories without any markings on them whatsoever..."
- Vice President for Planning and Business Devel-
opment
Further discussion of Intellectual Property considerations
are addressed in an associated white paper produced by
the authors for caBIG [12].
Authorized user agreement
One university has an existing project with some parallels
to the caBIG. The project aggregates public health data,
and makes it available to institutions including public
health departments throughout the country. The project
has developed an authorized user agreement that users at
the external institutions must sign as part of the process of
establishing access.
"What we do is we sign the agreements that get the data in
from both the commercial organization and hospitals. We
aggregate it here, then we sign agreements with each health
system that wants to access the data in which they agree to
use the data only for certain purposes. They acknowledge in
writing that we get the data under confidentiality restric-
tions, and they agree that anybody who is going to access it
from the public health system has to sign what we call an
authorized user agreement... a one-page agreement that
states... that they are only accessing it for their job.. . they
are not going to do anything else with it."
- University and IRB Legal Counsel
The need for users to agree to attest to their agreement to
abide by particular safeguards was echoed by a number of
participants:
"And a legal agreement that each individual agrees to abide
by when they ask for access . . .not just the institution, it's
the individual."
- Health System Privacy Officer
Data Ownership vs Stewardship
Most participants did not appreciate a difference between
stewards and owners. Others had definitions that were
not in agreement with the interviewer's definition. In ret-
rospect, the answers to this question would have been
more informative had the interviewer provided some def-
inition regarding these terms.
Scope of the collaboration
Effect of joining of new organizations on IRB processes
An important finding of these interviews is that many par-
ticipants will be willing to accept that individual organiza-
tions may join the community, without explicit approval
of every other institution (Table 8). As long as new organ-
izations agree to abide by the same principles, the addi-
tion of a new institution appears to pose few specific
barriers.
IRBs would find it useful to have an online registry, which
displays all organizations that have signed agreements:
"If there is a new institution coming in, we would like some
kind of registry process... maybe it could be just something
that is done online, and you can look up and say 'okay.
M.D. Anderson just signed on.' I guess that's okay."
- IRB Director
However, some participants were concerned that joining
organizations must be able to demonstrate that they have
sufficient resources and sophistication to implement both
the security technology as well as the security processes.
The problem could become that we are all only as strong
as our weakest link:
"Even if we all had common agreements, not all cancer
centers that are in caBIG have the same level of sophistica-
tion of some of the academic medical centers. Even if you
gave them a contract and told them to use them, there
would be concerns that there might not be the same
resources to ensure appropriate implementation if it were
distributed... and again, I assume there are no dollars asso-
ciated with that about setting up a system that is going to
require dollars to manage and maintain over time, and
Table 8: Would the joining of a new organization pose a specific 
problem?
Response Count Percentage
Yes 0 0.0
No 7 100.0
Scenario 2 – Question 14. A total of 7 interviews provided responses. 
Respondents included university and IRB legal counsels and IRB 
directors. Data was aggregated with interview as the unit of analysis.BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2009, 9:31 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/9/31
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your institutions... you have the responsibilities in the form
to do it but you do not necessarily have the dollars or the
right incentives to ensure they do it right. At this place
$600-million in sponsored research a year, we have got
resources to ensure compliance. Not all places do that. And
that would be my concern."
- University and IRB Legal Counsel
These concerns highlight the need for a process of creden-
tialing institutions that will participate in the data-sharing
community.
Foreign partnerships
There were significant concerns about the inclusion of for-
eign partners (Table 9), for a variety of reasons.
Although few participants would preclude foreign part-
nerships (Table 10), many wanted additional assurances
and controls.
Some participants were pessimistic about the inclusion of
foreign partners given the wide gap in policies:
"We would not deal with Europe. They have too hard of a
standard... caBIG has to involve international partners, but
they also have to make sure that it is realistic to do so, given
that each culture or country or union (like EU) has their
own unique regulations about electronic data transfer issues
in research."
- IRB Director
Commercial entities as partners
Several participants considered use of caBIG data by com-
mercial entities as problematic. The concern was that
commercial entities could exploit data for purposes other
than the advancement of science. In particular, there was
a concern that data might be passed on to commercial
entities without the knowledge of the providing institu-
tion:
"I want to be sure they are not marketing... that once they
get this data, that there are restrictions on them passing it
on."
- University Compliance Officer and IRB Legal
Counsel
The potential of commercial entities to gain access to data
was considered problematic by one participant because of
issues related to private inurement. Private inurement –
the benefit of a private interest at the expense of the non-
profit – is prohibited under law.
"When we are dealing with private industry, from my per-
spective, there is potentially a private inurement issue here.
If somebody in industry gets our data and uses it for some
type of financial gain to that company. In theory, private
inurement of a non-profit organization means it cannot
give something of value and not get something in return...
The concept is (that) a nonprofit institution would violate
it's nonprofit status by providing something of value to a
for-profit company. You have to get value for value. Because
otherwise, I'm giving away something which I have... some-
thing of value for which I have... which frustrates my not-
for-profit status or purpose, and if you are willing to give
away things like that, then I guess the argument goes that
there is no need for you to be a not-for-profit at that point
in time."
- Health System Privacy Officer
Table 9: Concerns described by participants regarding foreign partnerships.
Specific Concerns Count
Privacy requirements are different than US 4
Contracts are difficult to enforce overseas 2
Concerns about potential national security threat 2
Quality of foreign partner IRB review varies greatly 2
Cannot ensure that foreign partner will not be violating their own laws 1
Increased security may be necessary 1
Research ethics guidelines vary greatly 1
Scenario 2 – Question 22. A total of 9 interviews provided responses. Respondents included university and IRB legal counsel, IRB directors, office 
of Research representatives, and Privacy and Compliance officers. Data was aggregated with interview statement as the unit of analysis.BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2009, 9:31 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/9/31
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Existing organizational infrastructure for data sharing
The development of the envisioned research grid will
need to rely on local institutions to implement the proc-
esses in addition to the software. We found significant var-
iation in the infrastructure existing at these organizations
that could support federated data sharing.
Existing honest broker systems
Honest broker systems (also referred to as trusted third
parties) have been developed at some institutions to pro-
vide de-identified data, compliant with the requirements
of HIPAA "safe harbor" [28]. The "honest broker" acts as
a trusted, neutral third-party, often regulated by the IRB,
and may maintain the key which links the de-identified
record and the original identifier. Although this method
has been used locally, there have been no previous
attempts to deploy such a system across a federated grid.
Description of existing honest broker systems
Only one institution indicated that they had a formal
human honest brokering system in place, which was
established and monitored by the Institutional Review
Board (Table 11).
"The way we have the honest broker system set up is that the
healthcare organization certifies honest brokers, and those
honest brokers are typically at the department level. It's not
only on a particular projection or research project by project
basis, and so once those honest brokers have been certifica-
tion [sic]) by a certification process involving ultimate sign
off by the IRB as well as the privacy officer, once certified,
then those honest brokers would work either at the depart-
ment level or project level to take data from health organi-
zations and to de-identify it for the use by an individual
research project."
- Privacy Officer
Other participants described less formalized systems that
had developed over time where specific individuals had
the capability to de-identify data and this mechanism
began to be used by outside investigators:
"I don't think we have a true honest broker system. What
we have is an individual or a group of individuals who will
consult and will actually provide the mechanisms for de-
identifying data when asked."
- IRB Director
Other institutions had no existing mechanism to provide
such a disinterested party and opportunity for maintain-
ing a linkage file, which would permit re-identification to
the disinterested party but not to the investigators.
"I don't even think there is probably a disinterested party
that ever has done this either... if they de-identify, it would
be... one of the people in the research team that would do
it."
- University Compliance Officer and IRB Legal
Counsel
Participants who did not have any kind of honest broker
system nevertheless recognized the potential of such a sys-
tem to enhance the functioning of a data-sharing grid:
"I like the idea of this disinterested person being able to re-
identify, but again, under very controlled circumstances."
- University Privacy Officer
Table 10: What do you want to see from a foreign partner?
Response Count Percentage
Would not want foreign partner 18 . 3
Concerns about foreign partnerships may necessitate additional requirements 9 75.0
No specific concerns as long as partner meets same standards as US partner 2 16.7
Scenario 2 – Question 21. A total of 12 interviews provided responses. Respondents included university and IRB legal counsels, IRB directors, 
Office of Research representatives, and Privacy and Compliance officers. Data was aggregated with interview as the unit of analysis.
Table 11: Institutions with Human Honest Broker Processes
Existing Honest Broker Human Systems Count
Institutions with formal process 1
Institutions with informal process 2
Institutions without any identifiable process 2
Scenario 1 – Question 1. A total of 16 interviews provided responses, 
from 5 institutions. Respondents included individuals from all 
organizational roles. Data was aggregated with institution as the unit 
of analysis. For responses, where there was disagreement, we 
accepted any description of an existing informal process by any 
individual at that institution as evidence of an existing informal 
process.BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2009, 9:31 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/9/31
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The main benefit of such an arrangement appears to be
the potential to keep data identified only at the source
institution. The additional IRB requirements that may be
necessary for federated sharing of re-identifiable informa-
tion, suggests that the community should study whether
honest broker systems could reduce the number of cases
where identifiable information is necessary.
Existing approved process for automated de-identification
Two of the five institutions had experience with using an
automated method for text de-identification. One of these
two institutions has a formal policy regarding text de-
identification, which stated that data that had been
scrubbed by a specific system could be considered to be
"de-identified".
Re-identification
All participants indicated that when using a disinterested
party (honest broker), it was an acceptable practice for the
disinterested party to maintain a linkage file in order to
allow for re-identification of the patient or participant by
the disinterested party for the purpose of including addi-
tional data, as long as data remained de-identified to the
investigator (Table 12). The use of a disinterested party
and maintenance of a linkage file are described in the
HIPAA regulations.
Existing organizational decision-making structure related 
to privacy
We also found marked variation in the organizational
infrastructure underlying decision-making in the area of
privacy (Table 13).
Participants identified a wide range of organizational
structures regarding decision-making about privacy policy
and the interpretation of the HIPAA. The determining fac-
tor appears to be the relationship of the medical school or
university to the health system or hospital, producing a
wide variety of configurations:
"We have a HIPAA privacy officer for health systems, a
HIPAA privacy officer for research and a HIPAA privacy
officer in her legal office, and then one at a university level
that is sort of a king/queen HIPAA privacy officer over all
the other officers ... so that's kind of a funny model. So the
health system has a privacy officer who is in charge of man-
aging all disclosures whether they be research or health
care."
- Director, Office of Human Research
"We do have a director of [the] HIPAA security, and then
we have a director of the HIPAA privacy policies and pro-
cedures that need to be in place, and they govern that for
the university. Now, keep in mind, which is kind of a grey
area because our databases are actually on the health sys-
tem network, which they have their own policies and rules,
but it is supported by the university, which has their own
policies and rules."
- Director of Information Services
"The IRB generally serves as a privacy board if there is any
call or question raised about any of the particular issues."
- Director, Office of Regulatory Affairs
"I write all of the policies for [the] HIPAA in general. I
mean... in addition to the research policies as well, but the
IRB primarily does the governing of the activities with
regard to [the] HIPAA. For example, I created all of the
forms that we currently use for HIPAA/research that the
IRB currently uses, but they are more so the police of those
forms and those activities associated with the safe harbor
and all of the other activities."
- University Privacy Officer
Table 12: Can data be re-identified under an Honest Broker 
system?
Response Count Percentage
Yes 12 100
No 0 0
Scenario 1 – Question 2. A total of 12 interviews provided responses. 
Respondents included individuals from all organizational roles. Data 
was aggregated with interview as the unit of analysis.
Table 13: Who interprets HIPAA regulations at your 
institution?
Response Count Percentage
Privacy or Compliance Officer with IRB 3 21.4
IRB in conjunction with Legal Counsel 1 7.1
Compliance Officer with University Counsel 2 14.3
IRB or IRB Privacy Board 2 14.3
Privacy Officer 4 28.6
Formal mechanism being defined 1 7.1
Not Applicable – Not a covered entity 1 7.1
Scenario 2 – Question 11. A total of 14 interviews provided 
responses. Respondents included individuals from all organizational 
roles. Data was aggregated with interview as the unit of analysis.BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2009, 9:31 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/9/31
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"We have a privacy officer... on things that... directly
involve research – reports to the IRB, but a lot of the privacy
issues have to do with operations, and so then there... that
person reports to the Regulatory Affairs Office."
- IRB Director
"The HIPAA privacy officer works in the office of university
counsel under the person who is the lawyer for Corporate
Compliance. My institution has two distinct entities with
two boards of trustees – the university and the hospital, and
the hospital has their own office of legal counsel, and they
have their own privacy officer but there is interaction."
-Director, Division of Human Subjects Protection
It appears however, in the institutions represented in this
sample, that the health-system privacy officer typically
handles disclosures of the PHI, even when the disclosure
is related to research data.
Of note, in some cases we found that individuals at the
same institution did not always agree about which indi-
vidual or organization has the responsibility to interpret
the HIPAA legislation.
In most institutions, it was either the privacy or the com-
pliance officer with or without collaborative input who
investigated a PHI disclosure. Frequently, disclosures of
the PHI made in the course of university research were still
investigated by the officer on the health system side (Table
14).
The responses suggest that policies regarding notification
in the event of security incidents may need to follow very
different routes, dependent on the organization. Consen-
sus of multiple offices or organizations within the institu-
tion may be necessary. For example, it may be
advantageous to ask the IRB, Office of Research, and Uni-
versity Compliance and Privacy Office to weigh in on who
should be responsible for the local response.
Existing identity provisioning infrastructure
Several institutions were on the verge of adopting some
kind of automated, organization-wide identity manage-
ment infrastructure and processes suitable for the research
enterprise. Such infrastructure, sometimes called an Iden-
tity Management System, is used to construct automatic
systems for creating and managing user account and
access controls in many disparate computer systems
within a single management domain. The process (man-
ual or automatic) of creating and managing user identity
into the systems is termed provisioning, a term we fre-
quently use throughout this document. These institutions
were interested in using this local infrastructure for even-
tual automated provisioning of users into caBIG users:
"As we build processes and procedures to track the people in
our environment and create access for them, then revoke it
in a timely fashion, it would be very easy to extend that to
include caBIG and things like that. And I'd be happy to do
that, and then would treat that as important as maintain-
ing our own data, so I could step up to that obligation. But
if you came to me before I had my house in order and say
'oooo... we wanna do the caBIG thing', I am not going to
have the tools to really reassure you and say that we are
going to take seriously our responsibility to the federation
and make sure that these accounts are managed in a proper
fashion."
- Information Security Officer
Identity provisioning and authorization of users
For many participants, the development of the caBIG fed-
erated platform could prompt a reconsideration of how
decisions about access are made:
"If the systems are such that they can get into our data, we
might need to think for the first time about being a little bit
Table 14: Parties responsible for PHI disclosure tracking
Response Count Percentage
Privacy Officer 33 3 . 3
Compliance Officer 11 1 . 1
Either Hospital or University Compliance Officer in collaboration with IRB 2 22.2
Privacy Officer in collaboration with IRB 22 2 . 2
Not Applicable – Not a covered entity 11 1 . 1
Scenario 1 – Question 19. A total of 9 interviews provided responses. Respondents included individuals from all organizational roles. Data was 
aggregated with interview as the unit of analysis.BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2009, 9:31 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/9/31
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more circumspect and think about what qualifications we
would want to impose... I think there would probably be a
lot of regulatory compliance pieces we might want to spell
out more than we do now."
- Legal Counsel to IRB
Many participants had difficulty conceiving of the envi-
sioned platform and offered their insights with the caveat
that additional study would be needed. Additionally,
many participants had difficulty in distinguishing
between authentication and authorization requirements;
therefore, we have grouped these together in our analysis.
Further work is needed to separate the constituent require-
ments more carefully.
Parties responsible for provisioning
Regarding the provisioning of users, there was a prefer-
ence for local authority over these decisions with some
caveats. In general, IRB directors were willing to consider
either central or local provisioning given that data was de-
identified, but were less willing to accept central provi-
sioning if there was any risk of re-identification. However,
security officers, privacy officers, and compliance officers
generally preferred local provisioning (Table 15).
Most participants preferred to have local institutions man-
age the provisioning process using existing infrastructure,
because they felt local institutions were best positioned to
make these decisions, especially because of the centrality
of the IRB to this process:
"We have to sort of credential our own people, and we know
them, so...I mean I guess that with the proper credentialing
checklist, a national board could do it. It just seems to be
easier for local, because each local place is going to have to
submit to their IRB to get a project done, or to get a project
approved. So it seems to me like we would have to do it at
the local level, and then doing it at a national level or more
diffuse level would just be repetitive."
- Director, Division of Human Subjects Protection
"If I had to choose, I would say that each institution would cre-
ate the identities or manage the identities for the people there,
with the idea that the identity management ought to be closest
to where the peoples' homes are. If I am going to be responsi-
ble... if I am going to have some responsibility for it, I want to
be able to get out and a hold of those people, which means that
there is physical proximity or an employment relationship with
them, or some sort of titled relationship."
- Information Security Officer
Some participants felt that either approach would be
acceptable as long as data was de-identified:
"I think we would be comfortable...anywhere in there as
long as we had well-defined standards for what the author-
ization/certification process was. In other words... if the
data is de-identified... we would be very comfortable with
an external group setting the authorization and what secu-
rity access to the data."
- Director, Office of Regulatory Affairs
Many participants felt that provisioning by a centralized
body would simply be too cumbersome to create and
maintain, and that ultimately, the responsibility belonged
to the local institutions:
"Having that be fully centralized would be such an enor-
mous undertaking, that you have to rely on certain stand-
ards and capabilities at the local site. So I really think a lot
of that has to be the site becomes certified and how they can
provide identities, and access, and they're audited to make
sure they are doing it correctly. But I do think there needs
to be some sort of central structure that oversees that."
- Director, Office of Human Research
Other participants noted that differences between local
organizations could make the provisioning of users across
the entire community very complex. Without a central-
ized legal entity, the potential for variations in the process
remains:
"Well, it can be a point of weakness or a point of strength.
Obviously, these people have a level of sensitivity to the
individuals who are actually being granted access, and if
that person does a good job and you have a very strong con-
trol measure that they did a very haphazard and poor job,
then you could be granting access to a bunch of people that
(a) should never have had the data or (b) that they never
clean up the access when somebody leaves, so it all comes
down to whether these individuals are taking their jobs seri-
ously and doing it in earnest."
Table 15: Who should be responsible for creating identities and 
authorization?
Response Count Percentage
Local Institutions 9 60.0
Central Authority 2 13.3
Would accept either central or local 3 20.0
Depends on whether org is legal entity 1 6.7
Scenario 1 – Question 7. A total of 15 interviews provided responses. 
Respondents included individuals from all organizational roles. Data 
was aggregated with interview as the unit of analysis.BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2009, 9:31 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/9/31
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- Health System Privacy Officer
Another argument for at least some centralized provision-
ing was articulated by one participant who recognized the
importance for having a separate credentialing body for
investigators who were not affiliated with a caBIG institu-
tion. The development of Unaffiliated Investigator Agree-
ments parallels processes that exist at the cancer centers, in
which unaffiliated investigators may gain access to data
after attesting to the use of a particular IRB and to be
bound by the regulations of that IRB. Unaffiliated investi-
gators would need to be credentialed by a third party.
Another participant noted that motivation to properly cre-
dential users may in fact be related to whether one's own
data is "in the game". In effect, investigators being provi-
sioned at institutions that are not providing data to caBIG
may need to be treated in some ways as unaffiliated inves-
tigators because there may be little motivation to carefully
adhere to the requisite policies and processes:
"One of my big motivators is that I feel a heavy responsibil-
ity to safeguard the data that we hold...If I have no data
here, I couldn't care less about how the people at my insti-
tutions [handle] their identities, is set up – and that maybe
that means I am a poor federated citizen."
- Information Security Officer
What organizational unit could credential users
Some institutions had difficulty identifying an appropri-
ate group that could manage the provisioning process
within their institution. The IT infrastructure supporting
research is often meager compared with the IT infrastruc-
ture supporting clinical systems. In general, IRBs may not
be well positioned to perform this task, and developing
adequate control structures may be a significant task for
local institutions.
"The IRBs...they just wouldn't function well in that role. I
don't think there is an existing body that really could do it.
We have it on one side for... our clinical data on the <sys-
tem>. The business office has control. Every six months or
something, they send me a report so that these people need
to continue to have this level of access. On the research side,
that does not exist but it could go through [the] Office of
Research Administration or Office of Scientific Affairs."
- University Compliance Officer and IRB Legal
Counsel
In some cases, authentication and authorization decisions
require the cooperation of several groups charged with
provisioning access to systems and data. This "separation
of duties" is a well-accepted concept in security circles,
and consequently not surprising. As a result, we should
expect the involvement of a variety of local authorities at
caBIG institutions.
"I think it's too new, but if I could speculate, I would say it
would be a cross section between research and someone in
IT security."
- IT Security Manager
Local governance of provisioning
Many participants suggested that it was essential to have a
single individual at each institution in control of the
entire provisioning process.
"We would want to create some sort of governance here,
and then one local person – mediator or whoever – that
monitors this on who is getting access, why have they had
approval to police the access to any of the database. There
would need to be an individual to govern this, I think. To
me, it would need to be someone very knowledgeable of the
HIPAA rules and regulations . . . to be able to police it."
- Director of Information Services
"I think you want a point person at every institution who is
responsible for the various controls that are necessary for
data protection... which is what I use to combine privacy
and security."
- University Privacy Officer
Another important aspect of local control over provision-
ing was the need to have a person with authority vouch for
the identity of any individual gaining access.
"I would recommend that there be one individual at each
institution who is sort of top-level approver, and that top-
level approver might be able to... select a next level of
approver... This is the kind of thing we have done here – not
in the research context – but in other access to data con-
texts. So you have two people basically verifying the identity
of the individual, their authority to get the data, their need
to know, and I think having that kind of a structure is use-
ful. And as I alluded to earlier, you might also then have
reviews from time to time of those access permissions."
- University Privacy Officer
"I think that what has to happen is that, going back to the
process I described earlier is that this department chair or
somebody who is privy to that individual will need to vouch
for that person when they get their credentials."
- Health System Privacy OfficerBMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2009, 9:31 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/9/31
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Monitoring of credentialing process
There were a variety of responses as to the appropriate
process for monitoring credentialing (Table 16).
Potential for federated credentials
Very few participants were willing to answer Scenario 1,
Question 8, regarding what kind of federated credentials
might be acceptable. Reasons provided for the lack of
response included: (1) participants had little or no experi-
ence with federated credentials, (2) it was too early to
make such a decision, or (3) that such a decision would
require extensive consultation with the technical security
team.
Information needed about users to make provisioning and 
authorization decisions
Across all interviews, we were able to derive a set of
requirements for information needed about users (Table
17). We make no attempt to define those that are required
at the time of identity provisioning and those that could
be deferred to authorization.
Several participants felt that the HIPAA training (although
not technically required for de-identified information)
would be of significant benefit if there were any chance
that the information could somehow be re-identified.
An important finding from this question is the impor-
tance of establishing a relationship among the user, insti-
tution, and IRB protocol. As one participant put it:
"It comes down to you have to be assured that the person
(a) has the need to access the information, (b) have (sic)
gone through whatever IRB requirement, local area, local
IRB imposes upon researchers in general and (c) they agree
to abide by whatever agreements and standard terms or
conditions that the project imposes on people who access the
data."
- Health System Privacy Officer
Importance of verification of the IRB review during provisioning
Many existing institutional practices provide access to
data derived from human subjects only after verification
of the IRB review of this request:
"When it is submitted, we call the IRB approval. They sub-
mit...the search and say we have this IRB approval. They
have to send us the signed IRB approval, and then we con-
tact the IRB approval office for verification of that number
– ask them the number, and they tell us who it has been
submitted to and what the project is for."
- Director of Information Services
"There [are] already IRB processes in place that relate to
insuring that researchers are appropriately trained, that
they have the credentials – so those type of processes, I
think, are valuable to go through whether this is de-identi-
fied or identifiable data, because one of the chief purposes
of the IRB is obviously to control human subjects research
and protect the human subjects, and there is also [a] very
strong control point with regards to ensuring research integ-
rity and the like, so I think if you abide by the IRB [a] proc-
ess needs to be in place. I think you go a long way toward
doing what you need to do and ensuring these individuals
who are getting access to the data are going to do the right
thing."
- Health System Privacy Officer
Drawing from these established practices, many partici-
pants felt that this should be captured within the envi-
sioned system and that, in many cases, use of the system
should be within the context of an approved IRB protocol:
"There should be an additional piece of information from
an IRB-type committee that would say... that would at least
get permission for that researcher to access the data. When
the protocol is created, it can list the appropriate members
and each institution will have a role configured for that per-
Table 16: Acceptable monitoring of credentialing.
Credential Monitoring Process Count
Periodic compliance checks with random audits 3
Annual compliance check 2
Quarterly compliance check 1
Annual Peer Review 1
No monitoring necessary if data truly de-identified and no risk 1
Scenario 1 – Question 10. A total of 8 interviews provided responses. Respondents included Information Security Officers, IRB directors and 
privacy and compliance officers. Data was aggregated with interview as the unit of analysis.BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2009, 9:31 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/9/31
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Table 17: Information needed about users for provisioning decisions.
Information Needed to Make Provisioning and Authorization Decisions
Institution
Federal-Wide Assurance Number of IRB
Nationwide IRB Identifier
Quality of HIPAA training verified
Has institution agreed to abide by policies?
Has institution been debarred?
Investigator
Name
Institution(s) investigator employed at
Title(s)
Is IRB Human Subjects Research Training up to date?
Is the HIPAA training up to date?***
Who has personally vouched for this individual's identity and need for access?
User has agreed to abide by policies
User has promised not to try to re-identify data
User has promised not to share credentials
User has promised to use the system only for the purposes of the project
Has the individual been debarred?
Are there findings of research misconduct associated with the individual?
Have there been OHRP sanctions?
If user associated with unaffiliated institution – has user completed an unaffiliated user agreement?
If user is performing preliminary research – has there been some other institutional review or approval?
IRB Protocol
IRB approval number
IRB approval dates
Category of IRB approval (not HSR, exempt, expedited, full-review)
PI named on IRB protocol under which user is searching
Name and short description of project
Scenario 1 – Questions 9 and 12. Respondents included individuals from all organizational roles. Data was aggregated with interview statement as 
the unit of analysis.BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2009, 9:31 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/9/31
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son that allows him to be a part of it, and then on the oppo-
site end, the data owner would require that role, and that
kind of ties in with the governing body setting security levels
and assigning risk to data."
- IT Security Manager
"From an oversight perspective...it would be nice to know
when somebody [is] accessing a particular data set, that the
login includes the nature of that access and whether it is
preparatory or whether it is part of a research protocol, and
if it is part of a research protocol, some number or some
indication of what that protocol is."
- Director, Office of Regulatory Affairs- An excep-
tion to the requirement for IRB approval might be
preparatory research. The definition of what con-
stitutes preparatory research and the controls over
such preparatory research appear to differ among
institutions.
Difficulties with anonymous users
Anonymous users were considered problematic by all par-
ticipants and most would simply not allow it under any
circumstances (Table 18), even if the only data involved
had all been de-identified.
Many responses indicated this was simply impossible to
accommodate:
"Absolutely not. There can be NO anonymity. I think that
would shoot this thing in the head."
- Vice President for Strategic Planning
A few participants felt that under extremely controlled sit-
uations, this could be possible either by limiting the
access technically, or by having the organizing body hold
the identity in escrow.
"I think if you can establish an agreement between the pri-
vate industry and the data owner that there can be some
controls over how... some controls over who is accessing the
data from a purely network perspective. If we can limit
access to the database from a particular server, host, then
that might be reasonable enough to not have user auditing.
I don't think that the data should ever be opened up to
anonymous access unless at a minimum something like that
is in place."
- IT Security Manager
None of the participants was able to point to a specific
institutional policy against this, indicating that it simply
violated the norms of the institution.
Difficulties with accepting the HIPAA and IRB research ethics training 
from investigators at other institutions
Human subjects research (HSR) training is required for all
investigators who work with HSR data. HIPAA training is
required when data does not meet the requirements for
de-identification. For current caBIG users, it is expected
that users will at least need to meet the requirement for
HSR training. HIPAA training may be necessary when data
that may not meet strict standards for de-identification
under safe-harbor is shared using the limited data set
approach, requiring a Data Sharing and Confidentiality
agreement. Some institutions may also require HIPAA
training if data is considered to have risk other than the
risk of re-identification.
An important finding of these interviews, that came up
repeatedly, was that human subjects research protection
training and HIPAA training may not be acceptable from
one institution to another:
"And I'll tell you, our institution knows there is huge vari-
ety, and we do not accept outside institution's training."
- – Director, Office of Human Research
Respondents differed as to the best approach around this
problem. Many suggested that this was an important role
for the governing body to take on:
"What if our HIPAA training is much more extensive than
the training – the HIPAA training at X Hospital, I would
even want to know, at that [organizing body] level way up
there... I would want them to also do research on every-
body's HIPAA training modules to make sure that they are
just as extensive and rigorous as ours is, because I want to
make sure that those researchers are right on top of it and
know what's expected of them, and we do not want any
unauthorized access whatsoever."
- University Chief Compliance Officer
Some felt that standardization was the best option, and
that such a standard could eventually replace local
Table 18: Would you allow anonymous access to data?
Anonymous Access Count Percentage
Would not allow 7 77.8
Would allow 0 0.0
Would allow under special circumstances 2 22.2
Scenario 3 – Questions 15 and 16. A total of 9 interviews provided 
responses. Respondents included information security officers, Office 
of Research representatives, privacy officers, and compliance officers. 
Data was aggregated with interview as the unit of analysis.BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2009, 9:31 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/9/31
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requirements, and would, in and of itself be an enormous
step towards multi-institutional data sharing by removing
a significant barrier:
"I think the best answer here is not to have this be a locally
determined standard. I think there should be a national
standard and a program that we could all take that would
be adequate to say that we understand the basics of HIPAA,
and I think there should be recertification, as well."
- Director, Office of Human Research
One IRB director suggested the Collaborative IRB Training
Initiative (CITI) modules as a potential training standard
for human research subject protection across the caBIG
project. Similar modules might be constructed for HIPAA
training specific to research uses. Individual IRBs would
then need to agree to accept these modules in lieu of the
local institution's training requirements.
Building on this, one participant suggested that caBIG
develop its own specific training, including other kinds of
training (HIPAA, research ethics, etc.) that would be
acceptable to institutional IRBs and privacy officers. The
advantage of this approach is that privacy and confidenti-
ality issues could be addressed within the context of this
new research paradigm. Some issues such as "fishing"
which are not generally a problem in the current research
paradigm could then be addressed:
"Well, you could always have online training that any
potential user has to take before you give him access. [That
is] unique to the grid. Especially since it is such a unique
entity or beast. I think caGrid is such a huge concept that it
would be a requirement that they take the training course."
- IRB Director
A potential interim approach suggested by one university
privacy officer was to develop a list of the items that the
HIPAA or Research Subjects training must cover, and then,
upon joining caBIG, have individual institutions attest to
the fact that the items in the list are addressed in the insti-
tution's existing training program:
"If you do not want to create your own HIPAA training, I
would say that you want for some institutions that have
done it well, you would give them a test, and in order to give
them a test, you would want to say that they have [been]
educated on appropriate use, educated on safeguards, edu-
cated on consequences and on resources...That might be it."
- University Privacy Officer
Individual organizations may need to retain the right to
inspect the training practices of other organizations, and
fairly detailed information may be necessary until some
standard can be agreed upon:
"Well, first I would like to see a copy of their module and
their training program. And second, I would like to [know]
how often they are required to take that training....I'd want
to see the actual training program itself. I want to know the
qualifications of the trainer... know whether or not the indi-
vidual took that training and how they scored...and how
many times somebody failed."
- University Chief Compliance Officer
"Do they cover historical aspects of IRBs? Do they cover all
the issues about the Belmont report? Do they cover how to
consent [the] cognitively impaired? What is the yearly
update? How do they do that? Do they just... rubber stamp
or do they make somebody read something and get recerti-
fied?"
-Director, Division of Human Subjects Protection
Additional suggestions with regard to protected health information
Most respondents suggested that the situation changes
greatly when data is protected under the HIPAA.
"I would expect that for de-identified it's going to be a very
low standard ... I might take a blanket authorization... But
when you get up into certainly the fully identified, I am
going to want that information owner to sign off on each,
every single request independently to say 'Yes. This is okay.
This is okay.' Because that has a higher standard."
- Information Security Officer
The problem of credentialing users locally might be sim-
plified by use of a Business Associates Agreement (BAA)
that could be established with caBIG-associated institu-
tions by the proposed non-profit entity:
"...sign the Business Associates Agreement with the medical
center privacy officers of the world, which transfer, and they
credential you under a different Business Associates Agree-
ment. And they do that. I mean, they let other people get
access to their PHI, if they are business associates. So, this
thing develops and works with the limited data set or de-
identified data demonstrated and built expertise and now
[if you] wanted to get at the identifiable stuff, now you try
to approach it as a BAA."
- University and IRB Legal CounselBMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2009, 9:31 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/9/31
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Another difficult issue with identified information is that
passage of identified information will likely require an
IRB authorization agreement. "Such agreements are not
always accepted between institutions as discussed further
under the topic of patient consent, below."
Control over authorization decisions
Aspects of authorization that must be controlled locally
Although there were generally few responses to this ques-
tion, the responses we did collect suggested that local
institutions need to control characteristics such as roles of
their own users, and that they need to control the charac-
teristics that govern entry into their own data repositories:
"If we own the data, then we should definitely own the
authorization process. We would need to have reasonable
assurances that the other institution is practicing a solid
policy for validating their staff. The way I see this working
is what we are accepting from another institution is a vali-
dation of identity and another piece of information that
says you are allowed to see the data in this particular data
base, and if the owners of that data who are managing the
data base can set what that piece of information is and dis-
tribute it to the participants, so if that is setting up the level
for type of authorization to the data, then (that's what we
need to be in control of)."
- IT Security Manager
"I would claim that I need to have control over the ability
to reset their passwords or something, because they are
going to come to me to ask for that. And I certainly would
need to be able to control their roles that are defined in my
institution, but can I envision a scenario in which Dr. Bag-
gins is working here at (this institution) and has one role
here, but he also has a joint appointment at another insti-
tution, and that's a minor thing. So his identity is verified
here at the (sic) this institution BUT the other institution
vouches for his role as a researcher at the other institution's
protocol, based upon our identity. Yeah... that's reasonable
in a federated environment."
- Information Security Manager
Most participants who answered this question were will-
ing to allow entry into repositories that contained only de-
identified data on the basis of users meeting certain pre-
defined characteristics, but preferred to have a much
tighter control over access to identified data.
Third party vs. local verification of user attributes
In general, there were few responses to the benefits or
shortcomings of third party verification of user attributes.
This is possibly because participants had difficulty envi-
sioning such a remote verification of attributes. We were
able to document some examples of the need for third-
party verification, where the existing manual process
requires some look-up of an external resource. In one
example, individuals in the IRB assuring themselves that
another institution has a currently certified IRB, prefer to
have information about the Federal Wide Assurance
(FWA) come from a source of authority such as the Office
of Human Research Protections (OHRP):
"We would get it from the OHRP web site... You know...
institutions are constantly letting their FWA's lapse, so we
would look on the web site and ensure that their FWA is
active."
- Director, Division of Human Subjects Protection
As a legal matter, at least one participant indicated that
there were no specific barriers to third party verification:
"I think as a legal matter, the institution could agree to
that, but the decision about what is the adequate level
wouldn't be mine. It would be the IT people."
- University and IRB Legal counsel
Turning off access to data across the grid
Participants generally agreed that the termination of
access was an important capability that they wished to
retain as a right of participation in the project (Table 19).
Participants expect the ability to cease transfer of data
immediately with a specific user or an entire organization,
even though they felt they would use it rarely:
"If we found someone way out of compliance of what is
expected, we would halt further transfer and assess whether
we can continue to work."
- Director, Office of Human Research
"Well I think if I'm an institution that specifically had
data, that other institutions are using, and I personally as
an institution found that [there was] something they were
doing wrong, I guess I would probably be inclined to take
actions even before the granting authority took action. If I
really found out [it was] egregious and I had to do some-
thing...I think the likelihood that it would occur would be
almost never... but the value in being able to simply shut the
data off knowing that you can always turn it back on versus
not being able to shut it off, I think, would give the member
institution some level of comfort that they have some level
of control."
- Health System Privacy OfficerBMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2009, 9:31 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/9/31
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A number of potential reasons for termination of access
were offered from participants (Table 20).
Participants offered a range of answers to the question of
who should make the decision to turn off access (Table
21). A number of participants indicated that the data
owner should be responsible for turning off access, but
that some decisions regarding termination might come
from the IRB or local caBIG officer.
Step-up requests
Requests to step-up the level of authorization might
require additional processes, agreements, or alterations to
the IRB protocol (Table 22).
Auditing
Questions related to technical auditing requirements were
posed to three enterprise information security experts and
one hospital department information systems manager. A
subset of questions was posed to selected compliance and
privacy officers, and representatives of the Office of
Research. Due to the small number of responses, we pro-
vide summary statements as opposed to tables.
Level of audit trail required
Most participants indicated that audit information was
needed at data set or record level, for de-identified data.
Additionally, audits needed to address logging of author-
ization decisions as well as access to data:
"I want to have auditing and controls, and I want to be able
to say when (a person is) given authorization to use this sys-
tem... who vouched for him? Who vouched for his identity
to say that this is who he is. Who gave him access to this
specific data? And how do I know that when (this person)
ceases to have access to this data by some obscure criteria,
that is going to be revoked in a timely fashion and then
logged and tracked, and that motivation is purely for safe-
guarding the data that I have."
-Information Security Officer
In some cases, participants wanted to know who could
access data at any point in time, in order to perform com-
pliance checking on their own authorization decision-
making processes, or to determine individuals who are
not using the system in order to reconsider whether they
continue to require access:
"Definitely, ahead of time, we would want to know which
researchers have been approved – pre approved – as the
bona fide staff or faculty that may have access to that infor-
mation."
- University Chief Compliance Officer
"Well... I would want to know that institution B is review-
ing every year, who has access to this system, whether they
still need it, and whether they still need that level of
access... If someone has not used it in six months, chances
are they really do not have a need to know. "
-University Privacy Officer
Generation and Management of Audit Data
There was a consensus among the participants represent-
ing information security that local institutions should
generate the audit data and that some central authority
should aggregate, analyze, and distribute aggregated and
analyzed data back to the local institutions. Participants
wanted to retain the ability of the local institutions to
inspect all relevant auditing data, in order to evaluate the
sufficiency of any central investigation process, and also
because in some cases they must conduct their own inves-
tigation because they are the responsible party:
Table 19: Would you want to be able to turn off data access?
Response Count Percentage
Yes 8 88.9
No 1 11.1
Scenario 1 – Question 10. A total of 9 interviews provided responses. 
Respondents included IRB directors, information security officers, 
Office of Research representatives, privacy officers, and compliance 
officers. Data was aggregated with interview as the unit of analysis.
Table 20: Conditions where access to data should be 
terminated.
Potential Reasons for Turning Off Access to Data Count
Institution non-compliant with procedures 4
Misuse of resource by investigator 3
Data found copied and unsecured 1
User accessing information not described in IRB protocol 1
Investigator disbarred 1
Access no longer needed or not being used 1
IRB Protocol expired 1
Investigator no longer employed at institution 1
Scenario 1 – Question 13. A total of 9 interviews provided responses. 
Respondents included IRB directors, information security officers, 
Office of Research representatives, privacy officers, and compliance 
officers. Data was aggregated with interview statement as the unit of 
analysis.BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2009, 9:31 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/9/31
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"If it doesn't have the ring of truth to it, I am going to want
to go out and do my own investigation to verify... Even if it
does have a ring of truth to it, I may have my staff do some
cursory investigation. Do a little bit of fact checking on
this....just to make sure... and... I would like to have the
tools and the ability to do that."
- Information Security Officer
"There has [to] be an understanding that each institution
is allowed to review the others' process both in terms of what
their process is and some sort of follow-up audit process to
ensure that."
- Institution Compliance Officer
"...but I may further want to be able to say that as an infor-
mation provider, who has made data available to this con-
sortium – this federation . . . that I need the ability to go in
and audit the auditors or go in and look directly at the peo-
ple. . . the audit trails for the people that touched my data
to reassure myself that this is really working, because it's . .
I want the centralized community to do the heavy lifting. I
don't want to really be doing all this scrutiny and stuff, but
it's still good for me to periodically make sure that things
are working as proper . . as they should . . so I think I would
like to have the ability to peek in now and then, as well."
- Information Security Officer
Participating institutions need to feel that they can trust
any centralized security incident management processes:
"Where it would become awkward is if an event occurred,
the centralized body gave me a report, and it was crap. If it
didn't have the detail – if it didn't have the data, if it looked
like somebody was throwing squid ink at it . . . at that point,
the whole relationship is in jeopardy."
- Information Security Officer
Time interval for maintaining access log
Time intervals suggested by the four participants varied
markedly. Responses included: 45 days, 60–90 days, 6
years, and forever.
For de-identified data, there are no specific guidelines;
however, other requirements that were suggested in these
interviews may end up being the determining factors in
planning retention times. For example, one potential fac-
tor in establishing the appropriate audit log retention
time, is dealing with issues such as scientific misconduct:
"I think [another issue is having a] scientific misconduct pol-
icy...say you have an instance where from some IRB perspec-
tive, you have... non-compliance, I think there should be a
provision that those instances are disclosed somehow, because
you don't want to have data in there that was not consented
properly. That ruins everything. Let's say you have a physician
that had enrolled patients in the trial and had shared data,
and maybe it was de-identified and went through all the cor-
rect procedures. After the fact, we find out that 40 of the 50
patients were not consented according to the approved IRB pro-
tocol. So, by scientific misconduct standards, that data [should
no] longer be available for... research."
- Director, Office of Research Administration
If we need to be able to contact all investigators that have
used such potentially tainted data, we may need to preserve
audit logs for a much longer interval. This could be true even
for de-identified data. It should be noted that it will likely be
necessary to "quarantine" the affected data – that is, turn off
access to a broad group of people, potentially everyone using
the system – and contain the affected data indefinitely dur-
ing an investigation and remediation period.
Effect of level of identification
Interestingly, although many participants felt that other
controls would differ markedly among the different types
Table 21: Who should be responsible for terminating access?
Who makes Decision to Turn Off Access Count
Data Owner/Data Steward 2
IRB 3
Governing Body 1
Local Institution caBIG "Officer" 1
Scenario 1 – Question 13. A total of 7 interviews provided responses. 
Respondents included IRB directors and university and IRB legal 
counsels. Data was aggregated with interview as the unit of analysis.
Table 22: What may be required to authorize a step-up request?
Required for Step-up Count
Re-verification of identity 1
Additional agreements from user regarding security 2
Amendment of IRB protocol 1
Uncertain 2
Scenario 1 – Question 14. A total of 5 interviews provided responses. 
Respondents included information security officers, IRB directors, and 
university and IRB legal counsels. Data was aggregated with interview 
statement as the unit of analysis.BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2009, 9:31 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/9/31
Page 27 of 40
(page number not for citation purposes)
of data (de-identified, limited data set, and identified),
the same individuals generally felt that auditing require-
ments could be, and should be, essentially identical
regardless of the type of data:
"My audit requirements are the same for all of them. I want
to know who is accessing stuff regardless."
- Information Security Officer
Unlike processes that could pose barriers to research,
audit data is only a technical burden; therefore, the bene-
fits of having access to this information may outweigh the
costs:
"I would also say too that even if we are dealing with de-
identified data, you'd want to take a conservative approach
and still, set the standard of what a limited data set requires
in order to provide those conditional protections just in case.
This is a good argument, especially when we are doing a
multi-institutional type of study that you might want to
employ."
- Health System Privacy Officer
Impact of workflow tools on Auditing Requirements
Participants voiced concerns about workflow tools and
other processes that result in derived data. Here we use the
term workflow tools as a generic term to refer to mecha-
nisms that allow a series of operations and the data flows
between them to be modeled, and carried out in an auto-
mated fashion. A well-known example of a tool for scien-
tific workflows is the Taverna [29] workflow system. This
question is of relevance as caBIG™ is developing this capa-
bility as part of the caGrid tool suite. In particular, the
director of information services we spoke to who directly
controls a clinical database was very sensitive to the idea
that these class of tools might alter the initial data and
falsely represent it to the user:
"Another thing that will concern me too, is how do we know
the integrity of the data has not been altered.... I would
want to... verify that the data is still the same."
- Director of Information Services
The passage of identified data through third party work-
flow and analytic tools posed a particular concern, and
greatly increased the requirements for auditing:
"If you are passing fully identified data sets, these third par-
ties have to have agreements in place – full confidentiality,
security... You need to be qualified vendors in the sense that
someone who is assessing them they have the policies of the
institution correct – they are implementing them and peri-
odically are audited. That would be high-level scrutiny for
them. And then, it's just a matter of having some typical
thing you'd want from a vendor anyway about the reliabil-
ity of their processes. And from a software standpoint, you
know very well there are all sorts of validation checks that
need to be done, and you would simply just look at their val-
idation SOPs and it would be up to each user to decide
whether they wanted to do additional validation to prove
their validation. So I think once you've solved the security
issues, the rest is more like a traditional effort you might do
with any vendor, looking at validating their IT processes."
-Director, Office of Human Research
Auditing data portability and secondary uses
Several participants raised concerns about the portability
of data (from an IT perspective) and unauthorized sec-
ondary uses of data (from an IRB perspective), and cited
the need to audit data portability as part of our standard
compliance checking. Appropriate measures would need
to be developed to deal with such unauthorized second-
ary uses of data:
"I'd like to see security policies around the portability of the
data. You know, a lot of people work on laptops now. It's
more common to see laptop users than desktop users. That
brings out a whole new security issue. That's probably the
bigger issue – this is so much... that here, you've got the
data and how the thing is stored and collected, etc., we now
come to somebody's laptop... and how that's being man-
aged."
- Director, Office of Human Research
" [We would to turn off access] if we found data laying
around – that would really be easier for me to determine
from here – if we found hard copies of data laying around
or something like that, we would strip them of that."
- Director of Information Services
"I think the issue that we have here locally is continued
access to data sets that are pulled out of something like
caBIG and secondary uses of that data, so we think that if
somebody is creating a secondary use, that we do not have
very good policies. I am not sure any other IRB does as well,
as to making sure that an investigator has particular data,
understands that he has it for one use, and at the end of
that use, it be destroyed or a separate application to main-
tain it has to be developed. If de-identified... the risk is very
low . . .but if you move up to containing identified or re-
identifiable information, then the use security risks of hav-
ing multiple little data sets sitting around on computers that
have been downloaded from a central repository becomes
fairly significant."
- Director, Office of Regulatory AffairsBMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2009, 9:31 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/9/31
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Auditing compliance with IRB protocols
IRB directors and Office of Research representatives were
particularly concerned about the potential for inadvertent
misuse of the caBIG. In particular, the enormous volume
and variety of data available could increase the chances of
"fishing expeditions", where investigators hunt through
data without a specific purpose in mind.
"So if I requested I wanted to go in and look at... whatever
data is in there...6-year-olds having X disease in the year
2000, I shouldn't be able to get everything else that is in
there."
- Institutional Compliance Officer
"I think that what worries people about this project is that
you could have ...50 users identified at each site...sort of
willy-nilly go into databases and pull out stuff and then
decide about a project or start analyzing data."
- IRB Director
There are two potential approaches to the problem of
"fishing". Both approaches require that the investigator
present their IRB credentials at the time that they are pro-
visioned. Users can be required to attest to the fact that
they are using data for a purpose sanctioned by their IRB.
"I think that – I know that the people here would be much
more comfortable if they were assured that users were inves-
tigators who had a legitimate purpose for wanting to use the
data... I mean actually, what we would like is to say – all
right, this person has a given project that has been approved
and that the PI for that project – the user for that project,
and those he designates to work on the project – give assur-
ances they are going to use the data only for that project."
- IRB Director
Attestations might be made in the Authorized User Agree-
ment, but could also be reinforced by reminding users
each time they log into the system.
A second possible approach that arose from the interviews
is that we could audit users to be certain that they are in
fact viewing data that relates to their identified purpose.
"In the terms of whatever in signing on to use the grid, that
the expectation is that they will be randomly checked, and
if any uses are outside of IRB approval or lack of acknowl-
edgement of the resource, they are out."
- IRB Director
The need to audit compliance with an IRB protocol fur-
ther supports the need to capture sufficient information
about the approved protocol to judge the intent of the
research. It also suggests that data record may be the min-
imal level of auditing required even for de-identified
information.
Response to security incidents
Information Needed by Local Institutions in the Event of a Security 
Breach
We aggregated all information that would be requested in
the event of a security breach in Table 23.
Reporting requirements
Reporting requirements will vary depending on the inci-
dent, type of IRB approval, and state where data was col-
lected. Examples of entities that will require notification
in some cases include: (1) IRB of the providing institu-
tion, (2) IRB of the receiving institution, (3) funding
agency supporting the research, (4) OHRP, and (5)
patients in NJ and PA (if financial or SSN disclosed):
"Certainly, there is reportability back to the IRB. There is
probably reportability back to our audit committee of our
board, which oversees compliance in HIPAA at the very
minimum, depending if it's identified... I mean, it could go
all the way out to notification... certainly notification to the
patient if it's identified, but also perhaps the government
agencies."
- Institution Compliance Officer
"And if they were doing something that was against their
own IRB's approval, they would have to be reported to
OHRP or Research Integrity."
-IRB Director
"If any federal funds were involved in the research that use
[s] the grid as a source, they would report it to OHRP. They
would report it to the funding agency."
- IRB Director
IRB issues
An important finding of this research was that, in general,
participants accepted the idea of a two-protocol mode for
data exchange. In this model, both the repository owner
and the investigator (who may be at different institutions)
may have IRB protocols from their respective institutions.
This is true as long as all understand and agree to this
approach upfront:
"As long as the institution or group or investigator realizes
he is putting information samples, whatever, into a reposi-
tory that is going to be available to other investigators, and
they are going to be reviewed by their board... so that's
fine."BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2009, 9:31 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/9/31
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- IRB Director
Protocol required for setting up a de-identified repository
There was marked variation in the class of protocol that
institutions were likely to require to establish a data repos-
itory for caTIES, ranging from no HSR waiver to expedited
review (Table 24).
Protocol and agreements for searching a de-identified repository
We did not specifically ask about the kind of protocol
expected for the investigator at the receiving institution,
but several IRB directors offered that the protocol would
likely fall under a "Not Human Subjects Research" or
"Exempt" designation if only data was exchanged. For tis-
sue exchange, there was a wider variety of responses.
For data that is potentially re-identifiable, existing IRB
processes generally also utilize a Data User and Confiden-
tiality Agreement between the data provider and the user:
"We have other repositories ... research data. These have
been de-identified or it's data that is still identified but is
collected under an informed consent that allows a person
secondary research. And when we have those kinds of data-
bases, we allow people from other institutions to access.
They access them pursuant to a data use and confidentiality
agreement to limit the use to whatever the approved
research is and to agree not to further post, redistribute etc.
And then we would require that they provide their IRB
approval for what their research is. . . It may be exempted .
. expedited . .dependent on what it is they are doing and
what kind of data they are getting. But for right now, we
would consider that our responsibility to ensure when that
data goes out there, it is under an appropriate agreement
limiting the use by that person to something that is either
approved human subject research or not considered human
subject research under the federal [guidelines]"
-University and IRB Legal Counsel
As articulated by one privacy officer, a potential problem
with Data Use and Confidentiality Agreements in relation
to use within a federated data-sharing environment is that
they are typically specific to a project and executed
between the researchers and the other institution:
"I'd have to go through the [regulation] but there has to be
some relationship then back to the researchers just not the
institutions. Again, I think . . . you can't assume that it's
institution to institution. It's institution to researcher who
happen [s] to be affiliated with another institution."
- Health System Privacy Officer
Table 23: Information needed in the event of a security breach.
Information Needed in the Event of a Security Breach
Investigator
Name(s) of individual(s) responsible
Who funded the project?
Description of the project for which the data was accessed?
Data Accessed
Description of data accessed
Risk level of data
How many patients/participants/subjects were affected?
Were any identifiers present in the data?
Was any data modified – Is the integrity of the data still intact?
Dates of access
What period of time did the data cover?
Incident
Was data re-identified?
Where (physically) did the breach take place?
How many times was the data accessed?
Was the data accessed by more than one individual?
Was data made publicly available (for example on a public website)?
What state did the security breach occur in?
Were SSNs or other financial information released?
Management
What discipline was provided at home institution?
Who was responsible for maintaining security of data?
How was the incident discovered?
Who discovered the incident?
What was the chain of reporting once the incident was discovered?
Was there a failure on the part of the local institution?
What oversight did caBIG governance have over matter?
Was there an unaffiliated investigator agreement in place?
Scenario 3 – Question 17. Respondents included individuals from all 
organizational roles. Data was aggregated with interview statement as 
the unit of analysis.BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2009, 9:31 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/9/31
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The Problem of data outside the scope of consent
An important problem we detected with the current
assumptions regarding IRB protocols for grid use is that
data to be obtained under many protocols is bound by the
dates with respect to the IRB protocol. For exempt studies,
data obtained must have been collected prior to the grant-
ing of approval. This constraint is not required in cases
when the research has been designated "Not HSR".
"For exempt – it exists. It's on the shelf. There is no
intended forward stuff going on, and then if it is, it's min-
imal risk and you do a waiver, because... you [need to be]
assured of its safeguards. But then if it's just not human
subjects research, all that goes right out the window."
- IRB Director
It appears that this requirement is true only for the inves-
tigator-initiated IRB protocol, and not for the develop-
ment of the repository. Assuming data will flow
continuously into caBIG repositories from other sources,
it may be necessary for the grid system to regulate the
release of data in accordance with this constraint. In order
to provide data to a particular user, the system must know
the IRB type, and the date of approval of the IRB protocol.
Use of aggregate data
Most IRBs felt that use of aggregate data (for example as
histograms) would not be considered human subjects
research, and would, therefore, be suitable for preparatory
research (Table 25). However, at least one IRB director felt
that data needed to be physically separate and not simply
an aggregate view of more complete data sources.
"You would have to go to a separate repository to do that
because it could . . . you could not give access to the public
for that within that. . . You would have to take the data out
of the caBIG system that he needs and import it into a sep-
arate secure system that would be public access. But if you
want to give them access to the data so that they can manip-
ulate it themselves ... I mean, you have expanded your audi-
ence to potential people who have access to data which they
could attempt to re-identify without additional security that
would be built into the caBIG access. So, you're providing
to the network some assurance that Joe Blow at some other
institution isn't going to do that and allow secondary access.
It would be (sic) really be consider [ed] secondary access,
which would increase the probability that somebody poten-
tially could re-identify that data to a local level."
- Director, Office of Regulatory Affairs
Importance of defining a level of risk for IRB approval
The importance of risk level for making authorization
decisions has previously been discussed. Assurance
regarding the risk level at the providing institution is also
important for securing IRB protocols at the receiving insti-
tution. Thus, an aspect of the approval process for caBIG
repositories that needs to be addressed through agree-
ments and/or auditing is the assurance that information
in the repository meets the definitions of the appropriate
risk level – for example de-identified data under the
HIPAA safe harbor. Individual IRBs must have this assur-
ance in order to approve the protocol on the investigator
side:
"The other IRB would have to be assured . . .and know that
the data that the person was getting is in fact de-identified,
which it would be in the repository."
- Director, Division of Human Subjects Protection
For this reason, local caBIG repository owners and stew-
ards need to be able to define and attest to the risk level
specific to their context and state law. Sharing of data
must operate under these constraints.
De-identification
Assessing the risk of imperfect de-identification is an
expected local IRB function evaluating an IRB protocol to
establish a caBIG repository such as caTIES.
Not all institutions limit their definition to that which is
provided under HIPAA (Table 26). Additionally, it
appears that in some cases state law may supersede the
HIPAA definition of de-identified, further complicating
the matter of establishing uniform policies across a feder-
ated grid:
"The thing... I am worried about is because your are setting
this up in such a way that you are in fact creating a highway
for data... the rules of which each supplier (of) data has to
comply with are going to differ, and... that includes
whether or not something is de-identified. So in Washing-
Table 24: IRB protocol required for establishing repository.
Response Count
Not Human Subjects Research determination 1
Not Human Subjects Research determination OR Exempt 1
Exempt 1
Exempt OR Expedited 1
Expedited 1
Scenario 2 – Question 1. A total of 5 interviews provided responses, 
from 5 institutions. Respondents were IRB directors. Data was 
aggregated with institution as the unit of analysis.BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2009, 9:31 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/9/31
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ton State, for instance, the state law considers DNA infor-
mation as individually identifiable information, so even if
you took out all of the identifiers, that HIPAA dictates be
removed in order for it to be de-identified... So health care
information is considered identifiable health care informa-
tion under Washington law if it contains DNA informa-
tion.... You could never de-identify it under Washington
State law."
- Legal Counsel to IRB
In the case of Washington State, some have suggested that
state law may be interpreted to forbid transmission of
sequences from patient material, or even prohibit the
sharing of tissue from which DNA might be extracted.
The responsibility for assessing the adequacy of de-identi-
fication for patient related data appears to rest very clearly
with the health system or hospital. However, the use of an
honest broker to act as an intermediary between the iden-
tified clinical side and the de-identified research side ben-
efits both sides. The honest broker can thus take on some
roles of a data steward in assuring that data in a particular
system does not exceed the level of risk that later IRB
determinations are based upon:
"Now, when you say if there is one date, are you saying that
by accident it occurred? To me, that is a whole different
issue. I mean I think that whenever we talk about de-iden-
tification, there is always the potential that somebody
screws up and something gets in that should not be in, and
frankly, that does happen under our IRB rules. That is con-
sidered an unexpected event presenting a potential risk to
the subject and would be required to be reported to the chair
of the IRB who would then consider whether ...further
action needed to be taken. [With regard to the determina-
tion that the data is de-identified]...to me, that is a medical
system issue... what they think is an adequate system to be
identified, recognizing the risk that things happen. So from
my perspective, that's the hospital's decision about what is
adequate for PHI. The way the IRB has it set up, the med-
ical system has to certify the honest broker. If they certify the
honest broker, we accept their determination of what is ade-
quate."
- University and IRB Legal Counsel
Reducing risk of partial de-identification
Respondents were asked how they would reduce the
potential for incomplete de-identification if automated
processes are employed, as envisioned in the caBIG
project. Automated de-identification of free text has a
number of challenges, including recognition and preser-
vation of contextual information. For example, although
proper names in a text document must be removed, the
subject of an action in the text (i.e., Physician, Nurse,
Patient), must be preserved. Consequently de-identifica-
tion algorithms occasionally leave information in a docu-
ment that allows a human reader to infer identifying
information. The risk of this information varies from full
disclosure, as in the case of a proper name, social security
number, or other identifiers, to limited; as in the case of
missing the removal of a birth date or other personal
attribute (Table 27).
"If I know that there are really, really technical controls to
factor authentication, only one machine always patched,
firewalls, strong authentication, regular review, it makes
me a lot less worried about the occasional re-identification.
There's not a magic bullet for privacy or security. It has to
be a whole combination of things... do your gosh-darn best
to de-identify, and whatever you can't get to, depending on
your comfort there... you have to step up more controls if
you feel like you are really just not getting to a level where
you can be sufficiently comfortable."
- University Privacy Officer
Risks that go beyond accidental or intentional re-identification
Although de-identified data does minimize some risks,
many respondents were quick to note that even truly de-
identified data did not mean risk-free data:
"The reality is that even if it's de-identified data, I still have
some measure of responsibility over the data that my insti-
tution provides, and so there has to be some understanding
that the researcher...that the data is still some institution's
data, and it is a privilege for them to have access to it."
Table 25: Is aggregated data considered to be Human Subjects 
Research?
Response Count Percentage
Yes 1 20
No 4 80
Scenario 2 – Question 18. A total of 5 interviews provided responses, 
from 5 institutions. Respondents were IRB directors. Data was 
aggregated with institution as the unit of analysis.
Table 26: Does your institution have a more specific definition of 
de-identification than the HIPAA?
Response Count Percentage
Yes 1 20.0
No 4 80.0
Scenario 2 – Question 12) A total of 5 interviews provided responses, 
from 5 institutions. Respondents included individuals from all 
organizational roles. Data was aggregated with institution as the unit 
of analysis.BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2009, 9:31 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/9/31
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- Health System Privacy Officer
"The fact that it's de-identified and therefore qualified as
not human subjects research, that would get the IRB out of
it, but that's not going to necessarily get the institutional
concerns out of it."
- University and IRB Legal counsel
Patient consent
Acceptance of consent forms from other institutions
Four of the five IRBs indicated that they would generally
accept the consent form of another IRB. However, it
seemed unclear whether the case-by-case decisions that
governed such acceptance would really scale to caBIG.
Some participants saw acceptance of consent forms from
other IRBs in this federated environment as especially
problematic. One IRB director advised that a common
consent form agreed to by the participating IRBs was the
only way to avoid the need for point-to-point decision-
making by individual IRBs:
"It's something that has to come from this governing
agency; a common language, and then the individual IRBs
will have been involved in that, so that they are all or mostly
all on board. Because what you don't want to have happen
is... you don't want the individual IRB language, because
once they mess with the language, there is inconsistency.
You won't be able to use this across the different sites...And
I think that this is the biggest deal killer I can imagine,
quite frankly, because the IRBs will not agree with one
another. They are very disagreeable."
- IRB Director
Developing a common consent form would enable multi-
institutional prospective research projects, but would
require strong NCI leadership and involvement of the
individual IRBs, including face-to-face meetings of IRB
representatives to agree on a common form:
"You have to have that leadership, and the people who do
this, have to be practical. They have to really understand
these issues and the complexity of these issues. And I think
there does have to be some kind of consensus. This is a sit-
uation where it would be useful for NCI to have a couple of
focused consensus meetings where they deal with this... and
perhaps periodic telephone or video conferences, because if
this has to go full board, for example, somebody from this
IRB has to be in the committee meeting to justify why we
are doing it this way, which may not be the way we would
ordinarily do certain things. Part of this educational process
– every single IRB is different. That's the strength of the
IRB system, and the weakness of the IRB system. There has
to be a buy-in. There has to be real ownership. And I think
that what IRBs get out of this is they learn more about how
to think about the consent process. And frankly, I think all
the IRBs around the country – most of the IRBs and a lot of
the small ones are very interested in these issues. We under-
stand that the process does not feel right, right now. So I
think that's what incentives (sic) the IRB to participate in
this."
- IRB Director
Elements needed in the consent form
All four IRBs indicated that development of the repository
must be indicated on the consent form (Table 28).
If IRBs are willing to accept a separate consent form, this
may pave the way for a caBIG-wide form with common
language that could be appended to studies generating
caBIG bound data.
"It should probably be separate from the study consent... but
it should [be] an NCI sponsored, cancer initiative consent
that says 'Our institution participates in this initiative. It is
designed to create a highway of information and tissue that
will hopefully expand the speed at which cancer research is
done', and explain it in fairly great detail to the extent that
you can... and give them all the bad news... the bad news
being that information about you will be used by researchers
all over the world. Your tissue will be put into a repository.
It will be manipulated . . . find out if they say yes."
- Legal Counsel to IRB
Table 27: Additional measures suggested if de-identification may be incomplete.
Additional Measures for Potentially Incomplete De-identification
Quantify risk prior to establishing repository with biostatistics consultation
Provide test data for human review
Include QA mechanisms in Data Safety Monitoring Plan
Perform periodic random checks to assess completeness
Scenario 2 – Question 7. A total of 3 interviews provided responses. Respondents were IRB directors. Data was aggregated with interview 
statement as the unit of analysis.BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2009, 9:31 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/9/31
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Re-consenting of human research subjects
One participant noted that a significant security breach
might have the effect of requiring re-consent of patients
because the risks of participation would be altered (Table
29).
"We have lots of reasons for re-consenting or reauthoriza-
tion, depending on whether or not we believe the risks of
their participation change, so if there is a major problem
with a security breach or something, we may require the
investigators [to] go back and at least make an attempt to
re-consent or reauthorize the use of a particular data set."
- Director, Office of Regulatory Affairs
Waivers of consent as an alternative to re-consenting
An alternative to re-consenting in some cases may be to
obtain a waiver of consent. As one participant pointed
out, many important existing databases were obtained
without explicit consent for sharing of data, principally
because technology for such sharing was not yet envi-
sioned. Further, the keys that would allow re-consenting
have been destroyed according to the original protocols:
"At the time that many of these huge databases that cur-
rently exist or were created, there was never any expectation
necessarily that the technology would reach a point where
data sharing of the type you are trying to design would take
place. So, people were promised that any information about
you will be kept confidential. It would be only be shared
with those on the study staff, and any use of it will not have
any identifiers about you unless it has been approved by an
institutional review board in accordance with law, and
when we are done with this study, we will destroy the data."
- Legal Counsel to IRB
Waivers of authorization are a problem, because individ-
ual IRBs may not accept each other's waivers:
"Frankly, I don't think individual institutions are will [ing]
to accept other IRB's waivers and authorizations."
- Health System Privacy Officer
Another participant suggested that it would be very advan-
tageous to have uniform language regarding security safe-
guards that could be used by local institutions when
applying for a waiver of authorization from their IRB.
The problem of undefined future research
Undefined future research is a significant problem with
prospective studies that IRBs approach differently. Some
IRB directors we spoke to indicated that they encouraged
investigators to use the broadest possible language still
acceptable to the IRB. Others preferred to let protocols
remain rather specific to discourage undefined future
research. Two participants noted that the frequent
changes in consent form language could be a significant
impediment to using the grid for as yet undefined research
and that it was therefore critical to deal with the consent
issue as a community.
In the case of identifiable data, the problem of undefined
future research is made even more complex by the privacy
regulations. As one participant notes:
"The fact is that HIPAA seems to require a sort of a project-
specific authorization."
- Legal Counsel to IRB
One respondent considered the provision for undefined
future research to be especially problematic given the
multi-institutional nature of this project and the existing
IRB processes for handling waivers based on adequacy of
security measures:
"We do allow there to be a research protocol that allows
people to be entered into registry for future research, but
HIPAA does not allow you to collect data for future unde-
fined purposes. So what we are doing... normally, how it
would go is that the authorization will allow us to collect the
data, then further authorization would need to be used to
research that data in a different way or waiver of authori-
zation from the IRB assuming that they have sort of verified
all the security measures are in place...We put an indefinite
kind of time period on it because we are allowed to do that,
but we also make clear to them in the authorization that we
cannot do anything with that data unless we get their
authorization or have a waiver. That gets into my issue with
the huge gap on a national level. We use our IRB to deter-
mine whether there are adequate security measures in place
to waive the authorization and use the data for another pur-
pose. If you aggregate the data, you would need some sort
of national entity that would do that."
- Director, Office of Human Research
Table 28: Must the development of a repository be indicated on 
the consent form?
Response Count Percentage
Yes 4 100
No 0 0
Scenario 4 – Question 6. A total of 4 interviews provided responses 
from 4 institutions. Respondents were IRB directors. Data was 
aggregated with institution as the unit of analysis.BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2009, 9:31 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/9/31
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Discussion
Building effective security systems for a project of the size
and scope of caBIG remains a complex and challenging,
although manageable, task. The legal and regulatory land-
scape is difficult and evolving, with the current rules and
regulations being interpreted inconsistently by various
institutional review boards and regulatory bodies. The
grid concept, and indeed the concept of caBIG, is predi-
cated on the ability to share data freely in a federated fash-
ion. This implies supporting technology, supporting
business and legal agreements between parties. The cur-
rent practice of using various point-to-point agreements
to facilitate data sharing will not scale to the size envi-
sioned. Reducing the complexity of a system from one
that grows as the square of the number of interconnec-
tions to one that is linear in the number of connections is
a well-known and well-accepted principle of systems the-
ory. Here, the system we speak of is not technical machin-
ery, but rather the set of documents, agreements, policies
and processes required to create and sustain an effective
federation. Realizing this system is as much an exercise in
social engineering as in software engineering.
Below we discuss the important issues and high-level rec-
ommendations resulting from this work (Table 30).
Where the authors believe an important project assump-
tion has been verified by the interviews, the conclusion
stands by itself with no further action suggested. In most
cases, additional and ongoing effort – consisting of fur-
ther study, consensus building, and organization leader-
ship – will be required. In some cases, there are clear steps
that appear to be possible to build supporting structures,
both of governance and of infrastructure that would
greatly facilitate approval of federated systems by local
IRBs and other institutional officials charged with compli-
ance oversight.
Construct a separate legal entity for governance
The major recurrent theme that emerged throughout the inter-
views, either directly or as a logical consequence of verbal
statements made by the interviewee was the need for a clear,
cohesive, and empowered governing entity. This is similar to
the conclusions reached by the European Advanced Clinical
Genomic Trials on Cancer (ACGT) project, which concluded
that a separate data management board was needed [30].
Interviewees stated that a governing body was a necessity for
effective operation in areas where exchange of regulated data
(de-identified or identifiable data) was taking place. It was sug-
gested that this body must be a separate operating entity, pos-
sibly a non-profit entity. The governing body must have
oversight and accountability to the user community in a vari-
ety of areas. These responsibilities include accreditation of par-
ticipating entities, policy and enforcement authority in the
areas of data use, risk assessment, security policy and proce-
dure, auditing, compliance, dispute resolution, indemnifica-
tion, and liability allocation, among others (for a full
description, see Table 5). While small scale pilot operations
can be built and sustained initially with a small number of
institutions, large scale federated efforts must include a legally
separate governance structure for areas involving regulated
information exchange. This will have direct bearing on various
business arrangements between participants, security policy,
and potentially the technical implementations of the underly-
ing security system. Failure to recognize these areas and take
supporting action will likely limit usability, slow the broad
adoption of key components, and ultimately threaten the sus-
tainability of data sharing federations. An important incentive
to develop such a governing body is the indication that with
sufficient governance structure, point-to-point agreements
would not be obligatory. New organizations could join the
federation if they agreed to adhere to master document sets
and agreed to audit to demonstrate compliance with the same.
It also appears a key task of such a structure will be to pro-
vide a mechanism to support trust brokering among insti-
tutions that have different quantities of data exposed, or
among those of substantially different size and sophistica-
tion. Without this mechanism, some large data providers
may have reservations about releasing even de-identified
data unless mechanisms exist to reliably verify compli-
ance to a minimum set of standards by the consumer of
data.
Develop consensus on foreign and commercial 
partnerships
Regulatory groups have serious concerns about data shar-
ing projects aimed at including foreign and commercial
partners. At least some of these concerns stem from the
perception that foreign partners may have higher, not
lower, privacy standards.
Similarly, data sharing with commercial entities is viewed
as a problematic issue, but for reasons involving improper
Table 29: Situations where reconsenting of research subjects 
may be necessary.
Situations Where Subject Reconsent May be Necessary
More specific purpose than indicated on original consent form
Secondary testing creates data with new risks
Genetics Testing
HIV testing
Security of original data compromised
Patient/Subject has turned 18
Scenario 4 – Question 8. A total of 6 interviews provided responses. 
Respondents were IRB directors, university and IRB legal counsel, and 
an Office of Research representative. Data was aggregated with 
interview statement as the unit of analysis.BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2009, 9:31 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/9/31
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use of data. An interesting topic that emerged from these
interviews is the issue of private inurement – specifically,
can non-profit participants provide data free of charge via
a federated system without receiving value in return from
the commercial partner? Once again, establishing a gov-
erning membership body funded by membership fees
would probably limit the impact of this issue entirely
because derived commercial value could subsidize opera-
tions costs and therefore reduce membership fees to the
non-profit members.
Risk models and risk management processes for data 
within the Federation should be defined
Appropriate decision-making on security and privacy
issues derives directly from the characteristics of data and
the processes involved in the handling of data. In addition
to being verified by these interviews, this constitutes well-
codified security principles spelled out in standards docu-
ments such as ISO 17799:2005 [31]. An appropriate risk
model should take into effect state and local law, and con-
textual issues as well as more global aspects such as IP
value, clinical vs. de-identified vs. exempt/non-human
data, and re-identification risk. At a minimum, such mod-
els should include the risks to data, repositories, and insti-
tutions. Those dealing with de-identified data must
include some assessment of the likelihood of re-identifi-
cation. Existing, best practice frameworks for IT govern-
ance describe risk management methodologies in detail.
At a minimum, the standards indicated in Federal Infor-
mation Processing Standards (FIPS) 199[32] should be
used to categorize the elements of the risk model. Indeed,
depending on the precise governance model selected, if
Table 30: Summary of security and privacy requirements for a federated biomedical grid.
Guidelines
A separate legal entity for governance is desired.
Consensus on foreign and commercial partnerships should be developed
Risk models and risk management processes for data within the Federation should be defined.
Specific technical infrastructure to support the credentialing process in the regulated environment should be developed.
The feasibility of creating a federated honest broker system should be studied.
Local control of identity provisioning and authorization of users is desired.
The identity credentialing process should be strong.
A special credentialing structure for institutionally unaffiliated investigators will be needed.
Existing institutional infrastructure should be leveraged.
Develop or acquire acceptable HIPAA and research ethics training modules for the entire federated community.
A central auditing authority is a necessity.
All data sets dealing with human data, whether de-identified, limited, or fully identified, should be subject to the same auditing requirements.
Specific tooling to support the auditing functions is needed.
A Two-protocol Mode for Data Exchange is accepted by interview participants.
Further Study
Potential for federated human honest broker systems to reduce the number of cases where identifiable information is necessary.
Manner in which undefined prospective research involving data and tissue repositories will be consented and handled.
Establishment of data use and confidentiality agreements between participant organizations and individual investigators in a scalable fashion.
Development of common consent forms acceptable to all IRBs participating in a federation.BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2009, 9:31 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/9/31
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elements of a federation are ultimately classified as part of
the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002
(FISMA) [33], this may be a legal requirement. Those
seeking to develop large-scale data sharing federations
should not try to develop their own method ad hoc, but
rely on established and mature IT and risk assessment lit-
erature and practices such as the CobiT 4.0 framework
[34].
Develop specific technical infrastructure to support the 
credentialing process in the regulated environment
A specific area identified during the interviews, which
would facilitate data sharing, is an online registry of
"accredited" participating signing organizations. The con-
cept of having an online support infrastructure for proto-
cols, trust and security levels, IRB federal certification, and
other metadata to support the regulatory process decision-
making process emerged in several interviews. It is a
requirement that regulatory and compliance personnel be
able to determine – possibly ahead of time – who can
access what data under what circumstances.
Study the feasibility of creating a federated honest broker 
system
The interview process suggested that honest broker sys-
tems are of interest to the community to enhance data
sharing. Importantly for a federation, structured use of
such systems could reduce number of cases where it is nec-
essary for identifiable information to leave local control.
From a systems architecture perspective, honest broker
systems can be thought of as a design pattern containing
a requestor and a publisher. Consequently, data sharing
projects that develop software would be well served to
consider this a high level architectural model for con-
structing software.
Identity provisioning and authorization of users
The interviews surfaced substantial information on
requirements of identity provisioning and authorization
of access to data. Key points and recommendations are
presented below.
Our data suggest that local control of identity authentica-
tion and authorization issues is preferred by the majority,
although a significant proportion of the respondents
believed that central identity provisioning was a viable
possibility. Most of the participants in the interviews had
trouble understanding the concepts and implications
involved with a federated environment, even though fed-
eration of identity and data sharing practices represent a
model that retains and enhances local control. Further
work on user education and actual experience will be
needed for groups to achieve comfort with the concept of
federation. Respondents felt that responsibility and
accountability require local control in such a system; how-
ever, it was noted that because of the differences in prac-
tice between institutions, a centralized legal entity is
required to coordinate and enforce policy and practices.
Create a strong identity credentialing process
This study highlights significant concern about the
strength and robustness of the user credentialing process
(identity vetting) available within local institutions. A
number of reasons were given for this, including institu-
tion size, the amount of data a given institution serves to
the grid, differential financial support for clinical comput-
ing and research related functions, and organizational
structure and mission of the groups performing the cre-
dentialing process. There was a feeling that even though
IRBs need strong auditing and credentialing safeguards,
they may not be well positioned or staffed to actually per-
form credentialing functions. There was also strong desire
to have a single identified individual at each institution be
accountable for and in control of the entire credentialing
process. This includes having processes in place to verify
identity of users (what we would term "providing authen-
tication functions"), and to perform authorization func-
tions such as the association of a person with particular
research roles and allowing access to information
restricted by specific IRB approved protocols.
Local control of both authentication and authorization
can be facilitated by the use of a common certification
authority (such as Verisign™ [35] or SAFE-BioPharma™),
using a common certificate policy framework consisting
of a certificate practice statement and certificate policy,
and a registration agent certification process available to
each institution participating. Designated staff at each
institution could be certified as registration agents (RAs)
by the managing body of the certificate authority. The reg-
istration agents would then issue credentials to end-users.
This use of common practices and certification creates a
common and uniform chain of trust between all parties
involved in the federation. Development of such practice
frameworks should alleviate concerns expressed by IRB
members about institutions with insufficient internal pol-
icies. Such frameworks are used in a number of successful
federation efforts, such as SAFE™ [26], the University of
Texas Health Science System, and the federal E-Authenti-
cation [36] effort.
Create a special credentialing structure for institutionally unaffiliated 
investigators
In a federation where the basic membership level is
expressed at the institutional level, it may be beneficial to
develop mechanisms that allow individual investigators
who are not affiliated with member institutions to access
or even contribute data to a federation in a secure fashion.
As with foreign and commercial entities, unaffiliated
investigators pose significant challenges to the establish-
ment of a trusted federation. Most notably, they are notBMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2009, 9:31 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/9/31
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employed by a participating entity and therefore may
have less incentive to avoid breaching their agreement to
participate. Consequently, they may require more moni-
toring and control by the centralized governing body. Fed-
erations must develop mechanisms to deal with this issue.
Take steps to leverage existing institutional infrastructure
Several institutions interviewed have or are on the verge of
adopting centralized identity management systems. Not
surprisingly, participants expressed a desire to leverage
this infrastructure for any federations that they may join.
This parallels the situation among InCommon members
where institutional identity management and a central
university authentication authority is used for all systems
within a security domain. Indeed, many universities
require all information systems to use these institutional
identity services for authentication control. Developers of
data-sharing federations should consider the preferential
use of centralized identity management systems.
Develop or acquire acceptable HIPAA and research ethics 
training modules for the entire federated community
The interviews revealed clear difficulties with the accept-
ance of external HIPAA and IRB Research Ethics training
certification. This implies that it might be fruitful to seek
to resolve this issue in a federation-wide fashion. This
could be done by community wide effort to develop train-
ing and certification components as part of the caBIG™
program.
A central auditing authority is a necessity
All data sets dealing with human data, whether de-identified, limited, 
of fully identified, should be subject to the same auditing 
requirements
Auditing should be performed in the same manner and
level for all data sets dealing with human data. This
includes de-identified, limited data sets, and identified
data. The same auditing data should be captured regard-
less of risk level of the data itself.
From the perspective of the policy and compliance per-
sonnel interviewed the data support the requirement for a
specific body to oversee auditing. This group should be
developed and empowered to define compliance stand-
ards with policies, and to enforce these standards via an
accreditation process. Specific auditing functions this cen-
tral group would be charged with overseeing include both
technical and non-technical components, and consist of
policy review, adherence to agreements, adherence to
technical procedure and technical security architecture,
adherence to data release only through protocol, incident
aggregation, incident analysis, and communication of
audit data back to the member institution. The audit
group should provide a statement of compliance or non-
compliance with key policies and procedures for each
member institution.
Specific tooling to support the auditing functions is needed
Given the need for some form of centralized auditing sup-
port, the technical considerations are not trivial. Every
institution involved in a federation must have technology
support for the relevant security and privacy logs. How-
ever, coherent global audit requires efforts to standardize
security data elements and communication protocols.
Otherwise, the power of the auditing capability is reduced
to simply a set of local audits that may not appropriately
address systematic and end to end security and privacy
issues. Consequently, specific tooling is needed to support
both the centralized auditing functions proposed for the
governing body, and the specific data required for trust
development at the individual institutions. Interviews
suggest a preference for auditing at the individual record
level even when dealing with de-identified data. Local
groups need assurance that the remote audit data is being
properly maintained, that it has an acceptable retention
period, and that it is available to them for inspection on
demand.
A Two-protocol Mode for Data Exchange is accepted by interview 
participants
An important finding of this research was that, in general,
participants accepted the idea of a two-protocol mode for
data exchange for de-identified data. In this model, both
the repository owner and the investigator (who may be at
different institutions) may have IRB protocols from their
respective institutions. The relationship between parties
can be emergent and does not need to be specified in
advance, as long as all understand and agree to this
approach. This approach mirrors (at the data exchange
level) the governance structure of successful identity fed-
erations such as InCommon, SAFE, and the Liberty Foun-
dation.
Critical IRB issues remain that must be resolved
This study raised several important IRB issues that should
be clarified by development of community consensus
including:
￿ The manner in which undefined prospective
research involving data and tissue repositories will be
consented and handled.
￿ How data use and confidentiality agreements can be
established between participant organizations and
individual investigators in a scalable fashion.
￿ The development of common consent forms accept-
able to all IRBs participating in a federation.BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2009, 9:31 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/9/31
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In particular, the development of a common consent form
would greatly facilitate multi-institutional prospective
research projects, but would require strong leadership and
involvement of the individual IRBs, potentially including
face-to-face meetings of IRB representatives. Participants
suggested that this is important work where NIH leader-
ship is needed.
Limitations
Limitations of this study include potential selection bias,
and difficulty of participants describing risks of a novel
and unfamiliar technology.
Participants in this study were limited to stakeholders at
cancer centers who had already agreed to participate in
caBIG – a federated biomedical data grid. Thus, it is likely
that the institutions from which our stakeholders were
selected, have already bought in to the concept of data
federation. Participants from these institutions may be
more accepting of the basic premises of federation than
participants drawn from centers who are not participating
in the caBIG.
Throughout the interviews, we found that participants
had difficulty with some questions related to assessing
risks for such a technology as novel as a federated grid sys-
tem. Privacy and security requirements are typically con-
sidered only on the scale of an individual institution or
known business partners. Envisioning a world where
security must be managed across multiple, unknown part-
ners is a daunting task for many participants. Thus, further
efforts to gather security and privacy requirements should
be undertaken as federated systems emerge.
Although the number of participants in this study was rel-
atively small, we note that the sample includes most stake-
holders at five of the fifty existing NCI designated cancer
centers, representing a 10% sample of the institutions.
Given the detailed nature of the interview instrument, the
sample was deemed sufficient for the purposes of require-
ments gathering. However, it is entirely possible that
other security and privacy concerns and requirements may
exist which were not uncovered in these interviews.
Finally, this work represents a survey study prior to actual
design and implementation of data exchange systems. The
course suggested holds substantial sociologic challenges
in the reorganization of regulatory practices across multi-
ple institutions. This work will need to be further vali-
dated by comparison to functioning systems at a future
date.
Further Observations
The recently created NIH Genome-Wide Association Stud-
ies (GWAS) program [37] and the data-sharing policies
emerging from it represent an interesting development.
The GWAS data sharing mechanisms for the dbGAP data-
base are an example of a new program that has been con-
structed along the general lines of the framework
discussed in this paper. Data submission to dbGAP
requires pre certification by institutional officials in
advance of data submission and the pre certification must
be part of data sharing plan submitted with grant applica-
tions. Data quality, security and privacy are maintained to
certain standards and there are guidelines in place for
both the data repository at the National Library of Medi-
cine, as well as the research groups submitting the data.
Access to the database and use of data extracted from it
requires review by a data-access committee and a formally
submitted data-use certification agreement that must be
signed by institutional officials. Data distribution is
bound by additional constraints, including publication
embargo of developed results. Finally, there are mecha-
nisms in place to audit and review appropriate data access
and use.
The GWAS agreement uses a strong central governing
structure and places responsibility for adherence to the
terms of the data sharing and acceptable use agreements
on the institutions. This model is similar to existing ani-
mal and human subject protection mechanisms in that:
(a) an institutional-level commitment to protection and
compliance is required, and (b) the agreements are spe-
cific to the resource. The GWAS policy effectively lays out
resource-specific risk-assessment and risk-mitigation
plans to be carried out by all parties. In essence, all parties
have agreed to meet uniform minimum requirements and
standards, overseen by a common governance framework
to protect each other and third parties from risk. This
framework has many of the elements discussed in this
paper, with the minor variation that the NIH has chosen
to maintain dbGAP as a centralized resource, rather than
deploying a distributed or federated technology model.
Table 1 of Piwowar [38] summarizes possible classifica-
tions and the tradeoffs involved in selecting a centralized
or competing data sharing model.
The present study suggested, and the structure of the
GWAS repository confirms, that formal, advance risk-mit-
igation and institutional sign-off mechanisms should be
in place before sensitive data are collected and shared
through collaborative resources. There is high scientific
value in collecting and sharing very large and highly dis-
tributed data sets, but there is also high risk associated
with maintaining sensitive information in a distributed,
collaboratively operated information resource. These
joint pressures are driving the need to develop more
detailed, and more specific social mechanisms to permit
collaborative research while maintaining individual
accountability.BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2009, 9:31 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/9/31
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These trends are likely to continue and it would not be
surprising if institutions soon begin to deploy informa-
tion security oversight committees, designed and operated
in a manner similar to institutional review boards and
animal care and use committees where the security details
of individual proposed research projects are reviewed and
approved in the context of general guidelines and applica-
ble laws and regulations, all supported by appropriate
local infrastructure.
Conclusion
This study identified and explored security and privacy
requirements for large-scale federated biomedical data
sharing initiatives. Study data suggest many areas of con-
sensus among a sample population of stake-holders, and
also indicate areas where there is greater variability. It also
elucidates stakeholder opinions in the areas of govern-
ance, identity provisioning, auditing, honest brokering
and research training certification. Based on these opin-
ions, the authors propose an initial set of security and pri-
vacy requirements for an emerging federation. These
requirements are currently being used as a model for the
development of the caBIG data sharing and security
framework (DSSF). These requirements also represent a
general framework that can be used to inform the devel-
opment of other large multi-institutional data sharing
consortium. The findings, as well as the experiences of
other large scale data sharing initiatives suggest that data
sharing mechanisms will increasingly require strong cen-
tral governance, and institutional commitment to the
security procedures and policies of these organizations. It
may well be that we are seeing the development of risk
mitigation strategies and institutional sign off require-
ments on a resource-specific basis. The implications for
applied technology and biomedical informatics practi-
tioners will be the need to develop new applications and
knowledge infrastructure to support the processes of secu-
rity, privacy, and trust management in the regulated envi-
ronment.
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